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ESSAY
TRANSACTION CONSISTENCY AND THE NEW FINANCE
IN BANKRUPTCY
David A. Skeel, Jr.* & Thomas H. Jackson**
Neither scholars nor the derivatives industry have fully explored the
question of how the treatment of derivatives and repos in bankruptcy would
change if their exemption from a number of bankruptcy’s core provisions was
removed. This Essay tries to fill the gap, and to develop a more general theory
about the importance of “transaction consistency”—that is, equivalent treat-
ment of similar transactions—in bankruptcy. The effect of transaction con-
sistency on repos would be limited, because repos would automatically be ter-
minated as of the bankruptcy filing and thus could not be reinstated by the
debtor. Derivatives have more at stake, but the nondebtor’s right of setoff
would reduce many of the adverse effects. The special treatment should not
simply be removed, however. Given the distinctive attributes of these con-
tracts, the Essay argues that repo lenders should be able to immediately sell
some kinds of collateral, and that the automatic stay should be limited to
three days for derivatives. The Essay also explains how transaction consis-
tency can be integrated with the Dodd-Frank Act, and might make Dodd-
Frank’s resolution rules unnecessary in most cases.
INTRODUCTION
One of the few areas of American finance that the financial reforms
of 2010 did not dramatically restructure was bankruptcy. Designed for
financially troubled firms (and individuals), bankruptcy has a host of pro-
visions for staying individual debt collection,1 rearranging capital struc-
* S. Samuel Arsht Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
** University Professor, University of Rochester. We are grateful to Barry Adler,
Darrell Duffie, Franklin Edwards, Anna Gelpern, David Hahn, Richard Hynes, Rosa Lastra,
Locke McMurray, Charles Mooney, Ed Morrison, Habib Motani, Gideon Parchomovsky,
Mark Roe, Ken Scott, James Sprayregen, Kimberly Summe, Oren Sussman, John Taylor,
James Thompson, Antony Zacaroli, and participants at a faculty workshop at Bar-Ilan
University, at the Insolvency Roundtable at the University of Oxford, at the International
Centre for Financial Regulation’s “Future of Bank Funding” conference, at the Corporate
Law Roundtable at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and at Richmond and
Philadelphia Reserve Banks’ Workshops for helpful comments on earlier drafts; to
Elizabeth Hendee for excellent research assistance; and to the University of Pennsylvania
Law School for generous summer funding.
1. Chief among these are the automatic stay and the executory contract assumption
provisions. The automatic stay forbids creditors from seizing or selling collateral,
terminating contracts, or engaging in any other “act to obtain possession of property of the
estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). Similarly, 11 U.S.C. § 365 outlines permissible contract
assumption, giving the debtor the ability to assume valuable executory contracts even if the
debtor is in default at the time it files for bankruptcy.
152
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tures (and changing the relevant decisionmakers),2 and otherwise sorting
out viable from nonviable businesses.3 The Dodd-Frank Act borrows a few
provisions from bankruptcy for the new resolution rules it established for
systemically important financial institutions that fall into financial dis-
tress;4 it gives bank regulators new powers to deal with these institutions’
distress;5 and it calls for several studies of bankruptcy.6 But the legislation
does not amend the bankruptcy laws.
To appreciate just how remarkable the neglect of bankruptcy is, we
need only consider the regulatory treatment of the instruments of con-
temporary finance before and after the 2008 crisis. Prior to the crisis, the
financial innovations of the past thirty years—swaps and other derivatives
contracts,7 repurchase agreement (repo) financing,8 and structured fi-
nance9 in particular—were almost completely unregulated both outside
and inside of bankruptcy. Outside of bankruptcy, over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives were treated as private contracts between the two par-
2. This is the consequence of the so-called absolute priority rule, 11 U.S.C. §§ 725,
726, as implemented in Chapter 11’s reorganization rules, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1126, 1129,
which require that higher-priority creditors be paid before lower-priority creditors and
shareholders unless the higher-priority creditors consent to different treatment.
3. Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 8–17 (1986)
[hereinafter Jackson, Logic and Limits].
4. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 210(a)(11)(a)–(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1470–71 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5390) (incorporating bankruptcy-like fraudulent conveyance and preference provisions).
5. See id. §§ 201–217, 124 Stat. at 1442–1520 (to be codified in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.) (codifying resolution rules).
6. See id. § 202(e), 124 Stat. at 1448–49 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382)
(providing for bankruptcy study by Comptroller and Administrative Office of U.S. Courts);
id. § 216, 124 Stat. at 1519 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5394) (providing for study by
Federal Reserve and Administrative Office of U.S. Courts).
7. The major forms of swaps include credit default swaps, interest rate swaps, and
currency swaps. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B) (defining “swap agreement”). A credit default
swap functions like insurance, with one party (the protection seller) promising the other
party (the protection buyer) a payment in the event that a third party (the reference
entity) that is the subject of the contract experiences a “credit event” such as default or
bankruptcy. With an interest rate swap, one party agrees to pay one form of interest (such
as a fixed interest rate) and the other pays a different rate (such as an interest rate that
varies based on the prime rate). With a currency swap, one party agrees to pay a specified
amount of one currency (such as dollars) and the other promises a different currency
(such as euros). In each case, the obligations are usually netted out at the end of the
contract, and one party pays the other the difference.
8. In a repurchase or “repo” transaction, one party sells securities to the other and
promises to buy them back at a specified time in the future. See id. § 101(47) (defining
“repurchase agreement”). Repos are generally used for financing and are very similar to a
secured loan with securities as collateral.
9. In its most common form, structured finance, or “securitization,” involves a sale by
the issuer of assets such as mortgages or credit card receivables to a new entity. Investors in
the new entity receive securities issued by the new entity, and the funds they contribute are
used by the entity to purchase its assets. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of
Securitization, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1313, 1315–17 (2009) (outlining and explaining
securitization).
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ties, and 2000 legislation explicitly forbade the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) from regulating them.10 Inside of bankruptcy, repos and deriva-
tives were insulated from core bankruptcy provisions such as the auto-
matic stay, which prohibits creditors from terminating their contracts or
seizing and selling collateral,11 thanks to a series of legislative amend-
ments creating what are often described as “safe harbors” or “exemp-
tions” for these contracts.
When the 2008 crisis subjected the privileged status of derivatives
and repos to a stress test, it was, to put it mildly, found wanting. Deriva-
tives had been touted as reducing risk and as a self-regulating market.12
Imposing regulation, the reasoning went, would interfere with the mar-
ket, with potentially catastrophic consequences. Yet the absence of regu-
lation did not cushion the blow of any of the 2008 collapses—Bear
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, or AIG. In each case, it hastened the implo-
sion and magnified the risk that their defaults would paralyze the finan-
cial system. The absence of regulation was the problem, not a solution, as
we have documented in detail elsewhere.13
In response to this unintended stress test, the Dodd-Frank Act has
created a massive and entirely new regulatory framework for derivatives
outside of bankruptcy. If the new rules work as designed, most derivatives
(which are defined as “swaps” in the legislation) will be cleared on a
clearinghouse that will act as the guarantor of the obligations of both
parties.14 They also must be traded on exchanges (referred to in the Act
10. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E,
114 Stat. 2763A-365 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). The
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 excluded a broad range of derivatives
transactions from the jurisdiction of both the CFTC and the SEC, leaving them
unregulated by the federal government. Noah L. Wynkoop, Note, The Unregulables? The
Perilous Confluence of Hedge Funds and Credit Derivatives, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 3095,
3099 (2008).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
12. The most famous endorsement came from former Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan, who credited derivatives with easing the effects of the Enron and
WorldCom collapses. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks to the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Forty-First Annual Conference on Bank Structure: Risk Transfer
and Financial Stability (May 5, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Board
docs/Speeches/2005/20050505/default.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(attributing “the remarkable resilience of the banking system, which had [by the time of
earlier remarks by Greenspan in 2003] recently shrugged off severe shocks to the economy
and the financial system” to derivatives and sophisticated risk management).
13. See infra Part II (analyzing how repos and derivatives would be treated if subject
to same core bankruptcy policies as other contracts, and citing other works by each of the
authors on these issues).
14. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 723, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–82 (2010) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2) (discussing
clearing requirement). Technically, the clearinghouse is a principal to both parties,
becoming a buyer to every seller and a seller to every buyer. The effect is similar to a
guaranty, and this term will be used throughout the Essay.
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as “boards of trade”),15 which will require that they be more transparent
and their terms more standardized than in the past. The Dodd-Frank Act
does not regulate repos or structured finance nearly as extensively as de-
rivatives. But it imposes important new restrictions on their operation
outside of bankruptcy.16
The key phrase, once again, is “outside of bankruptcy.” Although the
Dodd-Frank Act will have important indirect effects on bankruptcy,
lawmakers left the bankruptcy treatment of derivatives, repos, and other
financial innovations largely untouched.17 Their special status endures.
This Essay offers a new perspective on the implications of this special
treatment. To motivate the analysis, the Essay identifies four different dis-
tortions caused by the special rules for repos and swaps.18 First, the spe-
cial treatment diminishes counterparties’ incentive to screen and moni-
tor the debtor, particularly with the systemically important firms that
dominate the derivatives industry and are likely to be bailed out if they
fall into financial distress. Second, the special treatment functions as a
credit subsidy for the new finance. Debtors favor the new finance over
traditional sources of funding, and creditors do not limit their exposure
to a potentially vulnerable debtor. Third, insulation from bankruptcy’s
core policies exacerbates the risk of runs by removing the debtor’s ability
to temporarily halt them. Finally, the absence of a stay and the prospect
of a mass termination of the debtor’s derivatives hinder a debtor’s ability
to effectively resolve its financial distress in bankruptcy. This initial analy-
sis draws on insights we and others have developed in previous work.
The Essay then turns to its principal counterfactual: What would ap-
plying the core bankruptcy policies—honoring a principle we will refer to
as “transaction consistency”—mean for derivatives and repos?19 Scholars,
15. See id. (discussing exchange requirement).
16. Most importantly, bank regulators are authorized to limit the amount of short-
term debt that a systemically important financial institution is permitted to have in its
capital structure. Id. § 165(g), 124 Stat. at 1429 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365). For
structured finance, the legislation requires that the originator retain at least 5% of the
credit risk of the structured finance entity. Id. § 941, 124 Stat. at 1891–92 (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78o-11).
17. This Essay’s particular concern is with repos and derivatives. The current
treatment of structured finance is less problematic, as it treats securitization transactions as
true sales, and thus, as remote from the issuer’s bankruptcy, except in egregious
circumstances.
18. Special treatment may prevent other distortions. The Essay considers these
benefits when discussing the effect that removing the special treatment would have. See
infra text accompanying note 22. R
19. To call this principle “transaction consistency” may seem heretical (or
unnecessary) to some bankruptcy insiders. It bears an unmistakable family resemblance to
the “equality of creditors” principle, a longstanding staple of bankruptcy that says similarly
situated creditors should be treated as equivalently wherever possible. Thomas H. Jackson,
Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 Yale L.J. 857,
859–68 (1982) (discussing idea of creditor equality). Despite the familiarity of the “equality
of creditors” principle, we prefer “transaction consistency” for several reasons. The first is
that the traditional term is so familiar that it has lost much of its content in practice. In
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including the two of us, have not previously worked through all of the
implications of removing the special protections for repos and deriva-
tives, and treating them more like other contracts. The results are surpris-
ing, even stunning. Despite the enormous energy that the Federal
Reserve, the U.S. Treasury, and the financial services industry have spent
over the past thirty years lobbying to insulate repos from the rules that
apply to ordinary contracts in bankruptcy, transaction consistency would
have only a limited effect on the treatment of repos. Because repos are
financing transactions—a “financial accommodation,” in bankruptcy
lingo—the debtor cannot “assume” them in bankruptcy, as it can other
executory contracts.20
With swaps, on the other hand, transaction consistency would mean
significant changes in the bankruptcy treatment; although even here, the
fears of the derivatives industry are overstated. While transaction consis-
tency would indeed suggest the debtor could assume these contracts, the
debtor’s ability to pick the good swaps and abandon the bad ones—to
“cherry pick,” as the industry ominously calls it—would be limited, since
bankruptcy would largely honor the master swap agreements that the in-
dustry uses to coordinate and net obligations.21
Moreover, this Essay does not simply call for a formalistic application
of transaction consistency that is blind to the characteristics of repos and
swaps that distinguish them from most ordinary contracts. Most impor-
tantly, they are highly volatile, with values often changing dramatically
over short periods. Many must be fine-tuned constantly, with the parties
recalibrating each other’s margin or collateral obligations daily.22 To ac-
count for these distinctive attributes, this Essay proposes several adjust-
ments from formal transaction consistency. With repos, it concludes that
lawmakers should continue to exempt cash-like collateral such as treasury
bills or agency debt from the automatic stay. This would enable
counterparties to quickly close out contracts involving securities that are
easy to value, are not likely to impose systemic risk on the financial sys-
tem, and usually will not be essential to an efficient resolution of the
debtor’s financial distress. The preferred treatment of cash-like collateral
would also encourage the parties to use these securities rather than more
addition, the two terms have different connotations. Equality of creditors connotes
fairness, and assuring fairness was its historical objective: In the nineteenth century,
sophisticated creditors were often discriminated against, as debtors favored friends and
local creditors. Fairness is still an issue, but transaction consistency gives a better sense of
the distortions created by deviations, which are the primary concern of this Essay.
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (2006) (excepting from power to assume or assign “a
contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations”).
21. The key provision here is 11 U.S.C. § 553, which honors prebankruptcy setoff
rights.
22. With many derivatives contracts, the parties are required to post “initial margin”—
which is the value corresponding to a portion of any potential obligations under the
contract—as well as “variation margin”—additional margin payments to reflect changes in
the current value of the contract.
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illiquid securities such as the mortgage-backed securities that featured
prominently in the 2008 crisis. With swaps, this Essay proposes the stay
should be limited to three days, due to the high velocity and volatility of
derivatives transactions. Although this Essay argues that master netting
agreements should generally be honored in bankruptcy, a counterparty
should not be permitted to use the (automatic) termination of a repo as a
basis for cancelling all of the obligations in a master agreement that in-
cludes swaps and other derivatives.
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I briefly outlines the rationales
that were used to justify the special treatment of derivatives and repos in
bankruptcy. It then shows how derivatives and repos fared in the 2008
stress test, culling lessons from the major failures. Part II analyzes the
implications of transaction consistency for derivatives and repos, looking
at their status as executory contracts, the implications of the automatic
stay, the contours of setoff and netting, and the application of bank-
ruptcy’s preference and fraudulent conveyance provisions.
Part III considers the implications of the new financial reform legis-
lation for the transaction consistency analysis. Of particular importance
are (1) the new requirement that most derivatives be cleared on clearing-
houses that will guarantee the performance of both parties to the con-
tracts and will impose suitable collateral requirements; and (2) the newly
minted Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) resolution rules
for large, systemically important financial institutions. For cleared deriva-
tives, the clearinghouse will become the true party in interest in the event
a counterparty fails. This means that the clearinghouse is more than just a
middleman in the transaction. A clearinghouse should therefore be sub-
ject to the same transaction consistency treatment in bankruptcy as is a
counterparty.
The Dodd-Frank Act’s new resolution regime has its own temporary
stay and other bankruptcy-like rules, which might seem to make the bank-
ruptcy treatment of repos and derivatives redundant. But the resolution
regime only applies to the largest institutions, and even these institutions
cannot use it unless the U.S. Treasury steps in and invokes the resolution
rules. Not only would the bankruptcy adjustments advocated in this Essay
apply in most cases, but they could also make the resolution regime far
less necessary. Armed with a stay and other bankruptcy protections, the
managers of a large troubled institution—the next AIG, for instance—
would have an incentive to file for bankruptcy before regulators inter-
vened, in order to control the disposition of the firm’s assets.
Recognizing the realities of the reform process,23 Part IV offers sev-
eral more limited alternative proposals for reform. Rather than moving to
23. This recognition comes in part from our own experience. Both of us were
involved in numerous discussions with Congressional staff of both parties, and in other
ways, during the legislative debates that led to the Dodd-Frank Act. While we would like to
think that we made a tiny contribution to the removal of a dedicated $50 billion fund from
the original version of the Dodd (Senate) bill, see Restoring American Financial Stability
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complete transaction consistency, Congress could constrain many of the
problematic effects of the current rules with a few very limited adjust-
ments. The most minimalist approach would simply reinstate the bank-
ruptcy rules that prevent contract termination by invalidating so-called
“ipso facto” clauses.24 A slightly more expansive strategy would also rein-
troduce a limited stay for swaps, without altering the treatment of repos.
Although neither reform promises the full benefits of transaction consis-
tency, either would correct the worst distortions of the current
framework.
The Conclusion briefly summarizes the analysis and the implications
of the transaction consistency principle advocated in this Essay.
I. WHAT HAPPENED? THE 2008–2009 STRESS TEST
Bankruptcy’s heart and soul lie in two provisions: the automatic stay
and the trustee’s power to avoid preferential transfers.25 The automatic
stay, which prohibits creditors from taking steps to collect what they are
owed once a debtor has filed its bankruptcy petition, is the key to bank-
ruptcy’s collective proceeding. From the moment a debtor files for bank-
ruptcy, the stay halts the “race of diligence” by creditors that might other-
wise lead to piecemeal liquidation of the debtor’s assets, setting the stage
instead for a coordinated resolution of the debtor’s financial distress. The
preference provision reinforces this collective solution to financial dis-
tress by empowering the trustee to retrieve payments or other transfers
made to a creditor within ninety days of bankruptcy.26 The preference
power aims to assure that some creditors are not treated more favorably
than others, and is designed to encourage creditors to trigger the collec-
tive proceeding rather than seeking payments from a troubled debtor
outside of bankruptcy.27
Since 1978, when the current bankruptcy laws were enacted,
Congress has created and steadily expanded exemptions for derivatives,
repos, and other financial contracts from these and related bankruptcy
Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2010) (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 15, 2010), our own
influence on the final legislation was essentially nil. With this Essay, we are going back to
the drawing board.
24. An ipso facto clause is a provision that defines the debtor’s bankruptcy or
insolvency as an event of default and thus as grounds for terminating the contact. The
rules that invalidate so-called ipso facto clauses for ordinary contracts can be found in 11
U.S.C. §§ 365(e), 541(c). Derivatives and repos are exempted from these rules. Id. §§ 559,
560, 561 (exempting repos, swaps, and netting agreements, respectively).
25. Id. §§ 362(a), 547 (outlining automatic stay and preference provisions,
respectively).
26. Id. § 547(b)(4). The reach back is extended to one year if the recipient of the
transfer is an insider. Id.; see also id. § 101(31) (defining “insider”).
27. See, e.g., Jackson, Logic and Limits, supra note 3, at 125 (explaining normative R
underpinnings of preference law).
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provisions.28 As of 2006, on the eve of the financial crisis, Congress had
exempted these contracts from the stay and preference provisions, as well
as the bankruptcy anti-ipso facto clause rules, the trustee’s power to avoid
fraudulent conveyances, and the limitations on a nondebtor’s ability to
setoff or net obligations that the nondebtor owes to the debtor against
obligations the debtor owes the nondebtor.29
This Part considers how the rationales that were used to justify the
special treatment fared under the severe stress of the 2008 financial crisis.
Two conclusions emerge: 1) The special treatment creates major distor-
tions in global finance; and 2) remarkably little attention was given (or
has been given since) to the precise implications that ordinary bank-
ruptcy treatment would have for these contracts.
A. The Rationales for Exclusion
Proponents of the special treatment—which included both regula-
tors like the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury and the principal industry
groups—have offered four primary rationales for excluding derivatives
and other financial contracts from the policies that lie at the heart of the
bankruptcy framework.
In the earliest debates, which predated the massive expansion of the
derivatives markets in the late 1980s and 1990s, the case for exclusion
focused on the status of securities professionals as middlemen rather than
true parties in interest in securities transactions. Suppose, for example,
that Buyer arranged with Broker to purchase a share of stock from Seller
for $100, and Buyer filed for bankruptcy after paying $100 to Broker. In
theory, the trustee in Buyer’s bankruptcy might sue Broker, alleging that
Broker had received a $100 preference, even if Broker had simply trans-
ferred the funds to Seller.30 Proponents of an exclusion argued that
Broker, in a scenario such as this one, is a conduit and is not really the
recipient of a preferential transfer.31 This rationale for exclusion is sensi-
ble and is easily reconciled with the transaction consistency objective.
28. For the chronology and other details, see Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel,
Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt
Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 641, 644–45 (2005)
(describing progression of congressional protections available to counterparties).
29. Id.
30. If Buyer did not pay for the stock immediately or bought it on credit, the payment
could be construed as a payment “on account of an antecedent debt,” which would thus be
subject to challenge as a preference. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2). As the initial transferee of the
payment, Broker theoretically could be asked to turn over $100, even if Broker was really
just a conduit. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (authorizing trustee to recover from “initial
transferee,” even if this transferee is not “entity for whose benefit the payment is made”).
31. “If a firm or a clearing organization had to return margin payments received from
a debtor when he had already transmitted those funds to others in the clearing chain,” a
witness testified in 1981, “its finances would be seriously undermined to the point where it
also might be driven into bankruptcy.” Bankruptcy of Commodity and Securities Brokers:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Monopolies & Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 165 (1981) (statement of Edmund R. Schroeder, Attorney,
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The second rationale for special treatment is that securities and de-
rivatives markets are too complex to be treated the same way as other
contracts. The complexity rationale sometimes merged with the middle-
man rationale. In a 1981 hearing, a lawyer representing the New York
Cocoa Clearing Association and the New York Sugar Clearing Association
warned: “[I]t should be borne in mind that when these moneys flow
through the clearing chain, they are disbursed in many different direc-
tions, and there really is no way of tracing where they have gone.”32 If the
trustee of a bankrupt broker “tried to go out into the system to recover
money paid as margin,” another witness stated, “then the whole system
would become paralyzed because nobody would know who was entitled to
what.”33
With the final two rationales, which came to dominate the debate—
discussion really, since contrary views were rarely presented—the focus
shifted squarely to the financial instruments themselves. Repos and deriv-
atives need to be insulated from the ordinary bankruptcy process, accord-
ing to the third rationale for special treatment, because subjecting them
to the stay and the trustee’s preference powers would magnify volatility
and retard the growth of the market.34 With repos, the bête noir was
Lombard-Wall, a 1982 bankruptcy court decision holding that a repo buyer
should be treated as a secured creditor in a bankruptcy of the repo seller
and subject to the automatic stay.35 Congressman Walter Fauntroy, one of
Barrett Smith Schapiro Simon & Armstrong, New York, N.Y., appearing for New York
Cocoa Clearing Association and New York Sugar Clearing Association).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 167 (statement of Stephen F. Selig, Esquire, Baer, Marks, & Upham, New
York, N.Y., appearing for Comex Clearing Association, Commodity Exchange, Inc., Kansas
City Board of Trade, Bache, Bear Stearns, Dean Witter Reynolds, and Merrill Lynch
Commodities). Securities and Exchange Commission Commissioner Bevis Longstreth
sounded this theme in the same hearing, opining that the application of ordinary
preference law to securities transactions “creates uncertainty which is incompatible with
the efficient working of the national clearance and settlement system.” Id. at 240
(statement of Bevis Longstreth, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
34. A slightly wider range of views emerged in the early discussion of repos than with
derivatives. The Department of the Treasury opined in the early 1980s that it might not be
necessary to exempt repos from the automatic stay. Letter from Paul A. Volcker, Chairman
of the Fed. Reserve, to Senator Robert J. Dole, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Comm. on
the Judiciary (Sept. 29, 1983). Although the Federal Reserve disagreed, they initially were
willing to consider minor limitations on the special treatment. In 1984, Representative
Peter Rodino stated that then-Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker had “stated in written
correspondence to this committee that amendments that limit protection to repo
transactions of $1 million or more” would be sufficient, and would “‘avoid major
exceptions to existing bankruptcy law.’” Bankruptcy Law and Repurchase Agreements:
Hearing on H.R. 2852 and H.R. 3418 Before the Subcomm. of Monopolies & Commercial
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 61 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 House
Hearing] (statement of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
35. Lombard-Wall Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Lombard-Wall, Inc.), 23 B.R. 165
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). Lombard-Wall was a securities firm that dealt with government
securities. Shortly after Lombard-Wall filed for bankruptcy in August 1982, the bankruptcy
court held that its repos would be treated as secured loans rather than sales and that they
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the sponsors of legislation creating the initial repo exclusion, reported
that Lombard-Wall alarmed market participants, magnifying their uncer-
tainty and slowing the growth of repos.36 The decision “cast a cloud over
the future health of the repo market” and “create[d] a risk of market
‘grid-lock,’” according to an industry witness.37
This rationale resonated particularly strongly with repos, because the
Federal Reserve uses repos itself in its efforts to adjust the nation’s money
supply and protect the stability of the financial system. If repos could get
caught up in a repo participant’s bankruptcy, the reasoning went, this
could interfere with the Federal Reserve’s handling of monetary supply.38
With swaps, industry representatives warned about the ill effects of
“cherry picking.”39 If a debtor could assume the contracts that were “in
the money” while rejecting its bad contracts and relegating the
counterparty’s claim for damages to general unsecured status, these rep-
would be subject to the automatic stay. The court issued a temporary restraining order
forbidding the repo buyers from selling the collateral absent court approval and
subsequently confirmed its ruling despite protests that the repo buyers’ inability to sell
their collateral would reduce the liquidity of the repo market. Id. at 166 (requiring repo
buyers to turn over securities to estate and holding that “[u]nless Lombard is able to
obtain and use the Securities immediately . . . Lombard will be forced to stop its
operations, leaving the estate and its creditors facing financial disaster”). For a good
discussion of the Lombard-Wall default and the push for bankruptcy protection, see
Kenneth D. Garbade, The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions in the 1980s, 12
Fed. Res. Bank N.Y. Econ. Pol’y Rev. 27, 35–36 (2006). Lombard-Wall’s failure came three
months after the collapse of another securities dealer, Drysdale Government Securities,
had rattled the government securities markets. Id. at 32–34 (discussing Drysdale failure
and shift to recognition of accrued interest that followed).
36. See 1984 House Hearing, supra note 34, at 19 (statement of Del. Walter R
Fauntroy).
37. Id. at 83 (statement of Robert Brown, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Public Securities Association). Witnesses predicted that the market would flourish, on the
other hand, if repo protections were expanded. Even years later, this reasoning for
expansive repo protections was solidly in place. According to Seth Grosshandler of Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, testifying in 1999: “Market participants could . . . enter
into . . . [repo] transactions with greater confidence that they will be easily enforceable,
improving the liquidity and cost of financing for the underlying instruments . . . .”
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part III): Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 388 (1999)
[hereinafter 1999 House Hearing] (statement of Seth Grosshandler, Esquire, Partner,
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton LLP).
38. Commenting on market concerns about the Lombard-Wall decision, Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker told Congress: “[I]f the repo market were to become less
attractive, its usefulness as an instrument of monetary policy would decline.” 1984 House
Hearing, supra note 34, at 71 (quoting Letter from Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Fed. R
Reserve, to Senator Robert J. Dole, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Comm. on the
Judiciary (Jan. 20, 1983)). For a lengthy exegesis on the importance of repo financing to
the nation’s financial markets and Federal Reserve policymaking activities, see In the
Matter of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 67 B.R. 557, 566–71 (D.N.J.
1986).
39. See, e.g., John C. Dugan, Derivatives: Netting, Insolvency, and End Users, 112
Banking L.J. 638, 640 (1995) (emphasizing “cherry-picking” concern).
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resentatives warned, the debtor’s bankruptcy could destabilize the swaps
market.40
The final rationale—which tended to silence any lingering objec-
tions (but looks more than a little ironic from a post-2008 vantage
point)—was the need to keep systemic risk in check. If derivatives and
repos were subject to the automatic stay, the argument went, a debtor’s
failure could have a domino effect, taking other participants in the deriv-
atives market down with it.41 A counterparty that had entered into a large
derivatives contract with the debtor to hedge its business risks might find
itself unhedged if it could not cancel its contract and enter into a new
hedging contract with someone else. The counterparty might also face
rising losses as contract values continued to change. Any delay in the
counterparty’s ability to terminate its derivative with the debtor could
therefore have a crippling effect and might even undermine confidence
in the market more generally. If counterparties could quickly exit their
contracts, on the other hand, the derivatives markets would adjust and
quickly restore their equilibrium.
Prior to the 2008 crisis, these rationales (especially the last one) were
viewed as dispositive.42 The special treatment for derivatives and repos in
bankruptcy was steadily expanded, and there was no serious initiative to
rein it in.
B. Evidence from the Crisis
Just as the 2008 crisis called the self-regulating derivatives and repo
markets into severe question outside of bankruptcy, it also refuted the
arguments for their insulation from the core provisions of bankruptcy.
The discussion that follows briefly highlights the lessons of the three most
prominent collapses, with a particular emphasis on details that will in-
form the analysis in Part II.
40. For criticism of this argument, see Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and
Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special Treatment, 12 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 61, 68–73 (2009)
(“The Bankruptcy Code does not change [the calculations of an insolvent company], as
the power to reject under section 365 is precisely the same as the power to breach when
insolvent. The ‘cherry picking’ argument then loses much of its force.”).
41. See 1999 House Hearing, supra note 37, at 352 (prepared statement of Oliver R
Ireland, Associate General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)
(“The right to terminate or close-out protects [financial institutions] . . . on an individual
basis, and by protecting both supervised and unsupervised market participants, protects
the markets from systemic problems of ‘domino failures.’”).
42. See, e.g., Michael H. Krimminger, Adjusting the Rules: What Bankruptcy Reform
Will Mean for Financial Market Contracts, FYI: An Update on Emerging Issues in Banking,
FDIC (Oct. 11, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2005/101105fyi.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting “[i]f [a counter-party] . . . is placed into
bankruptcy or receivership, the normal stays on termination of contracts and liquidation of
collateral could create escalating losses” and “as a result, the ability to terminate the
contract and net exposures quickly can be crucial to limit the losses to the non-defaulting
party”).
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1. Bear Stearns. — As Bear Stearns bled cash in early March 2008, it
consulted a team of bankruptcy lawyers about the possibility of a bank-
ruptcy filing.43 If the bankruptcy exclusions were an effective mechanism
for dampening a run, allowing a Bear Stearns bankruptcy should have
been a live option. In reality, Bear Stearns’s repo counterparties ran even
before the bankruptcy decision was made, and Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson and then-New York Federal Reserve President Timothy Geithner
rejected bankruptcy as unthinkable.44 Not only did regulators have little
confidence that bankruptcy’s special repo and derivatives provisions
would dampen the risk of a run, they worried that a mass sale of repo
collateral could drive down the values of mortgage-related securities and
further destabilize the markets.45 This calculus suggests that the very ex-
clusions that were justified as reducing systemic risk—allowing
counterparties to terminate (and sell collateral) notwithstanding the au-
tomatic stay—can actually exacerbate it through the very sale of that col-
lateral when the troubled institution is a large player in the relevant mar-
kets, as Bear Stearns was.
The concerns that the special exclusions would not stop a run, and
that they might even trigger one, are issues that arose once Bear Stearns
had become financially distressed—that is, they are ex post concerns. The
exclusions may have had pernicious ex ante effects as well. Because repos
and derivatives are insulated from the stay and the trustee’s avoidance
powers, they are privileged as compared to other methods of financing.46
Bear Stearns may have relied more on repos, and less on equity or tradi-
tional secured finance, for its funding because of the special status repos
enjoyed. Mark Roe has pointed out, for instance, that the percentage of
Bear Stearns’s repo financing climbed from 7% of its liabilities and twice
its equity in 1990, to 25% and eight times its equity in 2008.47 It is impor-
tant not to overstate this effect. As demonstrated in the next part, transac-
tion consistency in bankruptcy would have a much smaller impact on the
treatment of repos in bankruptcy than it would on derivatives. But even a
43. William D. Cohan, House of Cards: A Tale of Hubris and Wretched Excess on
Wall Street 66–67 (2010) (describing consultation of Bear Stearns top executives).
44. See, e.g., Kate Kelly, Fear, Rumors Touched Off Fatal Run on Bear Stearns, Wall
St. J., May 28, 2008, at A1 (noting discussion among Geithner, Paulson, and Bernanke
concerning likely fallout from allowing Bear Stearns to collapse).
45. David Wessel, In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic 166–68
(2009) (“The Fed pushed for the Treasury to promise to ‘indemnify’ the Fed if mortgage-
linked securities ultimately weren’t worth the $30 billion.”).
46. The possibility that the special treatment in bankruptcy could subsidize use of
derivatives as compared to other forms of financing was first identified by Franklin
Edwards and Ed Morrison. See Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and
the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 Yale J. on Reg. 91, 121 (2005)
[hereinafter Edwards & Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code] (noting “the
Code may unintentionally alter the debt structure of firms towards a greater reliance on
derivatives by favoring derivatives counterparties over other creditors”).
47. See Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis
Accelerator, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 539, 552 (2011).
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small advantage for repos over ordinary secured credit may have distorted
Bear Stearns’s financing decisions.
2. Lehman Brothers. — A seldom noticed fact about the fateful days
before Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 2008 was that
the credit default swap (CDS) market was—at least based on CDS
prices—almost the last to know about Lehman’s travails. The spreads on
CDS contracts insuring Lehman debt showed little evidence of impend-
ing default until immediately before Lehman’s collapse on the weekend
of September 12–14, 2008.48 Until the spike in spreads finally began a few
days earlier, the CDS market showed few signs that anything was amiss.
This remarkable pricing pattern does not testify to the market partici-
pants’ obliviousness, as might seem to be the case at first glance. More
likely, it demonstrates the CDS protection sellers’ confidence that they
would be bailed out if Lehman collapsed.
The special protections for derivatives compounded this distortion
and may have magnified the losses Lehman’s unexpected collapse caused
in two respects. The first concerns the now-infamous Repo 105 transac-
tions that Lehman employed at the end of each quarter to disguise the
amount of its leverage. For accounting purposes, repo transactions are
ordinarily characterized as financing, rather than a sale. But Lehman in-
terpreted the accounting rules to allow a repo seller to treat a repo as a
sale if the underlying securities are worth at least 105% of the cash paid
by the repo buyer. As recounted by the examiner appointed in Lehman’s
bankruptcy, through this interpretation, Lehman characterized the repos
as sales rather than financing—i.e., debt—to buff up its balance sheet in
late 2007 and 2008.49 This recharacterization of repos as sales shaved
$38.6 billion from Lehman’s debt in the fourth quarter of 2007, and
$49.1 billion and $50.38 billion in the first and second quarters of 2008
respectively.50
Bankruptcy’s special treatment of repos subtly but centrally invited
this accounting manipulation. If the bankruptcy laws treated repos as the
secured transactions that they clearly are,51 the accounting loophole
48. See David Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and
Its (Unintended) Consequences 28–29 fig.2.3 (2010) [hereinafter Skeel, New Financial
Deal].
49. Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 732, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.,
Bankr. No. 08-13555 (JMP), 2011 WL 4071995 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011)
[hereinafter Valukas Report], available at http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/ (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (concluding repos were used to “create materially misleading
picture of the firm’s financial condition”). Spurred by the Examiner’s report, the New York
Attorney General has sued Lehman’s accountants, Ernst & Young, alleging that they were
aware of Lehman’s manipulations and failed to disclose them. See Complaint, Cuomo v.
Ernst & Young LLP, No. 0451586 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://
www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2010/dec/ErnstYoungComplaint.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
50. Valukas Report, supra note 49, at 739. R
51. For a discussion of the question of whether repos are lending transactions or sales,
see infra Parts II.B.1–2.
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might never have emerged. Repo 105 is in this sense a legacy of the quest
to exempt repos from bankruptcy in the wake of the Lombard-Wall deci-
sion.52 The pretense that these financing transactions were sales delayed
recognition of Lehman’s true financial condition and almost certainly
magnified the costs of its failure.
The second contribution of the derivatives exclusions to Lehman’s
losses is exemplified by J.P. Morgan’s ability to seize and sell Lehman’s
assets immediately before it collapsed. Owed roughly $20 billion by
Lehman, J.P. Morgan froze $17 billion in securities and cash and de-
manded a $5 billion payment.53 Because of the special treatment of deriv-
atives, Lehman could not prevent J.P. Morgan from selling the assets by
filing for bankruptcy, had little choice but to make the payment, and
could not expect to retrieve the payment in a subsequent bankruptcy.54
The effect of the special provisions once Lehman did in fact file for
bankruptcy was somewhat ambiguous. Lehman was able to sell its invest-
ment banking operations to Barclays even without the stay, and over
700,000 derivatives contracts were terminated and netted without causing
Lehman’s counterparties to fail.55 But the absence of the automatic stay
sowed considerable confusion and contributed to a large loss of value at
the outset of the case. “Lacking the full benefit of a ‘breathing space’
within the contours of the bankruptcy code,” Harvey Miller, the lead at-
torney in the Lehman bankruptcy, told Congress a year later, the begin-
ning of the case was “a period of perpetual crisis.”56
3. AIG. — With AIG, the derivatives exclusions played an unambigu-
ously problematic role. AIG’s fortunes went into a freefall after it was
forced to begin posting collateral for its large portfolio of CDSs (which
were written on pools of mortgage-related securities) due to a ratings
downgrade.57 AIG’s counterparties repeatedly ratcheted up their collat-
52. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text (discussing Lombard-Wall case). R
53. See, e.g., Darrell Duffie, The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks, 24 J. Econ.
Persp. 51, 67–68 (2010) [hereinafter Duffie, Failure Mechanics] (describing J.P. Morgan
interventions).
54. See, e.g., Susanne Craig & Robin Sidel, Crisis on Wall Street: J.P. Morgan Made
Dual Cash Demands, Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 2008, at C2 (recounting pressures J.P. Morgan put
on Lehman).
55. See, e.g., Debtor’s Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Sections 105 and 365
of the Bankruptcy Code to Establish Procedures for the Settlement or Assumption and
Assignment of Prepetition Derivative Contracts at 4, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc.,
Bankr. No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2008) (“[T]he Debtors are party to
approximately 930,000 Derivative Contract transactions of which approximately 733,000
are purported to have been terminated.”).
56. Too Big to Fail: The Role for Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law in Financial
Regulation Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 9 (2009) (prepared statement of Harvey R. Miller,
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP).
57. According to a subsequent report by the Special Investigator General for the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), Federal Reserve and Treasury officials feared a
panoply of potential consequences if AIG stopped making payments to counterparties,
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-1\COL104.txt unknown Seq: 15  3-JAN-12 7:45
166 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:152
eral demands, to the point where compliance threatened to cannibalize
the company.58 If the CDSs had been subject to an automatic stay in the
event of bankruptcy, AIG could have just said no to the collateral de-
mands, knowing that bankruptcy would offer a stay and a breathing space
for arranging a response to the company’s financial distress.59 In addi-
tion, if the CDSs had been subject to bankruptcy’s preference provision,
last-minute collateral grabs would have been avoidable as preferential
transfers.60 The special exclusions from the stay meant that AIG had no
choice but to accede to the collateral demands, and the preference exclu-
sion meant there would have been no way to recover anything from fa-
vored creditors like Goldman Sachs, which also received billions of dol-
lars more as a result of the AIG bailout.61
The special derivatives provisions also significantly influenced the
government’s decisions. The potential consequences of mass termination
of the CDS contracts—which would be made possible in bankruptcy by
the counterparties’ ability to invoke ipso facto clauses and their exemp-
tion from the stay—were a principal justification for the government’s
decision to arrange $85 billion (eventually boosted to $182 billion) in
rescue funding.62
*   *   *
Distilling the experience of these signature 2008 cases, we can iden-
tify five adverse effects of bankruptcy’s departure from transaction consis-
tency for repos and derivatives. First, the special treatment dampens
including “the impact on the American retirement system [because many retirement plans
had bought stable value fund contracts from AIG]; the impact of AIG’s commercial paper
obligations[;] the broader effect on the already frozen credit markets and money market
mutual funds; and the considerable systemic risk to the global financial system.” Office of
the Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), SIGTARP-
10-003, Factors Affecting Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG Counterparties 9 (2009)
[hereinafter SIGTARP Report], available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2009/
Factors_Affecting_Efforts_to_Limit_Payments_to_AIG_Counterparties.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
58. See generally Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Testy Conflict with Goldman
Helped Push A.I.G. to Precipice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 2010, at A1 (describing AIG’s
difficulties retrieving alleged collateral overpayments from Goldman Sachs).
59. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006) (providing for general stay), with id.
§ 362(b)(17) (providing exception for swaps).
60. Compare id. § 547(b) (describing transfers, including transfers of collateral,
within ninety days of bankruptcy avoidable as preferences), with id. § 546(g) (outlining
special treatment of swaps).
61. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp & Serena Ng, Report Rebuts Goldman’s Claim on
AIG: TARP Audit Suggests AIG Collapse Could Have Resulted in Big Losses, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 18, 2009, at C1 (questioning Goldman’s claim that they were fully protected and thus
did not need bailout).
62. See, e.g., SIGTARP Report, supra note 57, at 9 (reciting Federal Reserve R
Chairman Ben Bernanke’s testimony identifying “global banks and investment banks that
had $50 billion in exposure to losses on loans, lines of credit and derivatives” as reason for
intervention).
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counterparties’ incentives to screen and monitor. A counterparty that can
be confident it will be protected will be less careful about whom it con-
tracts with—that is, it may not screen carefully—and it is less likely to
actively monitor the actions of its contractual partners.63 In our view, in
the case of derivatives, the contribution of the special provisions to that
outcome is principally indirect, through a close linkage with the prospect
of a bailout of the debtor’s derivatives counterparties. The dampening of
monitoring incentives appears to be most serious with swaps. Because
these contracts are particularly likely to be bailed out if the government
considers the debtor to be systemically important, swaps creditors are in-
sulated from the consequences of failing to carefully scrutinize the
debtor’s financial condition. The special treatment of derivatives in bank-
ruptcy magnifies this problem by removing the debtor’s ability to halt a
run by filing for bankruptcy, which ratchets up the pressure for a
bailout.64
Second, the special treatment distorts a debtor’s financing decisions.
The special treatment makes repos and derivatives more attractive
sources of financing than alternatives such as traditional secured loans.65
The bankruptcy protections are not the only reason for investment
banks’ dramatic increase in use of repo-based financing, but they surely
contributed to the trend. Major changes to the bankruptcy laws in 2005
extended the protection of repos to mortgage and mortgage-related col-
lateral, including the mortgage-backed securities that Bear Stearns and
Lehman used in their repo transactions right on the cusp of the 2008
crisis.66 Unlike traditional secured finance, short-term repos can be pul-
led immediately by refusing to roll over the repo at the first sign of
trouble. As a result, financial institutions that depend heavily on repo
financing are subject to runs, much as commercial banks were before the
63. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Boundary Games, 4 Brooklyn J. Corp.
Fin. & Com. L. 1, 18, 20 (2009) [hereinafter Skeel, Bankruptcy] (describing monitoring
effect); see also Roe, supra note 47, at 556–60 (exploring monitoring issue in detail). R
64. James Sprayregen, a leading bankruptcy attorney who was consulted when AIG
threatened to collapse, has recalled that bankruptcy was briefly considered as a possible
option, but rejected precisely because bankruptcy would not stay the termination of AIG’s
derivatives. See E-mail from James H.M. Sprayregen, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, to
David Skeel (Jun. 9, 2011, 1:48 PM EST) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Sprayregen
further elaborated on this idea in discussions with the authors at the Richmond and
Philadelphia Federal Reserve Banks’ Workshop: Financial Firm Bankruptcy held on July
26, 2011. The new Dodd-Frank resolution rules counteract this to some extent for the
companies to which they apply by providing for a temporary suspension of ipso facto
clauses. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 210(C)(10)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1491 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
But derivatives are still likely to be bailed out by regulators in practice. See infra Part III.
65. See, e.g., Edwards & Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code, supra note
46, at 121 (noting substitution effect). R
66. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 123, 138 (2010) (suggesting changes to Bankruptcy Code may have encouraged
use of mortgage-backed securities as repo collateral).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-1\COL104.txt unknown Seq: 17  3-JAN-12 7:45
168 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:152
advent of deposit insurance in the 1930s.67 By increasing the incentives to
use repo financing, the bankruptcy safe harbors exacerbate the fragility
of the financial system.
Third, in addition to increasing the risk of runs indirectly, by encour-
aging the use of short term financing, the special treatment can also di-
rectly contribute to runs. This argument is the flipside of the derivatives
industry’s contention, most plausible for smaller debtors, that special
treatment can prevent system-wide problems. If the debtor is the
counterparty to a large number of contracts, as AIG was, the absence of a
stay seems especially likely to fuel runs, rather than forestalling them.68
Absent a stay, the debtor faces the difficult choice of meeting escalating
collateral demands, even to the point of dismembering itself, or filing for
bankruptcy and triggering the simultaneous termination of all of its con-
tracts, which can cause systemic damage by driving down asset prices.69
Fourth, and relatedly, the special treatment diminishes managers’ in-
centive to prepare for, and to file for, bankruptcy if the firm falls into
financial distress, because bankruptcy does not offer any protection
against counterparties’ efforts to terminate their derivatives and seize or
sell collateral. This means that regulators, who often wait far too long to
intervene, will be the ones to decide when to invoke bankruptcy or other
insolvency proceedings.
Finally, the special treatment can interfere with efficient ex post reso-
lution of the debtor’s financial distress. If the debtor is not able even
temporarily to halt its counterparties from terminating their contracts, it
may face a crippling loss of value at the outset of the case. This could
significantly impair the efficiency of the resolution process.
*   *   *
Despite these adverse effects, it is still possible that transaction con-
sistency would be worse than the existing protections. To reach firmer
conclusions about the regulation of the new finance in financial distress,
it is necessary to consider carefully just what effects transaction consis-
tency in bankruptcy would have, as well as the implications of the Dodd-
Frank reforms.
67. This comparison is a central feature of Gary Gorton’s recent work. In an article
with Andrew Metrick, he argues that “the core problem in the financial crisis was a run on
repos,” which occurred when nervous repo buyers increased the amount of the “haircut”—
that is, the difference between the value of the collateral and the amount the repo buyer
pays in the initial sale. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking
System, Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Fall 2010, at 261, 264, 279, available at http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2010_fall_bpea_papers/2010fall
_gorton.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). “An increase in a repo haircut,” Gorton
and Metrick argue, “is tantamount to a withdrawal from the issuing bank.” Id. at 279.
68. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J.
Corp. L. 469, 495 (2009) [hereinafter Ayotte & Skeel, Bailouts] (making this argument).
69. Id.
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II. WHAT WOULD TRANSACTION CONSISTENCY MEAN
FOR DERIVATIVES AND REPOS?
This Part asks how repos and derivatives would be treated if transac-
tion consistency were restored in bankruptcy—that is, if repos and deriva-
tives were subject to the same core bankruptcy policies as other contracts.
A. Bankruptcy’s Treatment of Ordinary Contracts
Bankruptcy, of course, does not treat all contracts the same. Con-
tracts that have been completed by one party or the other are either as-
sets (if completed by the debtor) or liabilities (if completed by the other
party). And if the contracts remain materially uncompleted by both par-
ties—and thus have elements of both assets and liabilities—they fall into
a third category: executory contracts.70 Thus, only in the context of exec-
utory contracts does it make sense to talk about the debtor’s “choice”
between assumption (i.e., a belief that the asset value exceeds the liability
value) or rejection (i.e., a belief that the asset value is less than the liabil-
ity value) of the contract. Even then, the Bankruptcy Code sharply limits
the ability of the debtor to assume (or assign) one type of executory con-
tract: a contract “to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or finan-
cial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor.”71
We make this point because different financial contracts would face
different bankruptcy rules based on their underlying attributes. Generally
speaking, for present purposes, it is possible to identify three “typical”
contracts that, because of their underlying attributes, have somewhat dif-
ferent treatments in bankruptcy. Once we identify those three typical
contracts and their bankruptcy treatment, we can “map” various financial
contracts to those groupings.72
First are loans, as well as contracts to make loans (or extend other
financial accommodations), to the debtor. These are all, effectively,
“breached” upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by the debtor. The
value of the breached loan is calculated as of that moment—as is the
70. See Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 Minn. L.
Rev. 439, 460 (1973) (defining executory contract as “a contract under which the
obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed
that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach
excusing the performance of the other”); see also Jackson, Logic and Limits, supra note 3, R
at 105–18 (discussing special nature of executory contracts in bankruptcy).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (2006). This prohibition on assumption or assignment also
applies to contracts to issue a security of the debtor, id., or where applicable law “excuses a
party . . . from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other
than the debtor.” Id. § 365(c)(1)(A).
72. This Essay focuses on the treatment of these contracts in bankruptcy in terms of
(a) their valuation, (b) their ability to be assumed and/or assigned, and (c) their
protection (in the case of contracts backed by security interests). This Essay later addresses
other issues involving such contracts, such as the application of preference law to payments
received within ninety days of bankruptcy. See infra Part II.E (explaining that preference
and fraudulent rules are waived off for repos, derivatives, and other financial contracts).
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value of any collateral that may be securing the loan. The claimant with-
out security (or other rights, such as recoupment or setoff) holds an un-
secured claim, valued at that point (and without interest or such—unless
all unsecured claims are going to be paid in full).73 The secured credi-
tor’s claim, if undersecured, is bifurcated into a secured claim and an
unsecured claim.74 The value of the collateral is likewise determined and
“fixed” as of the date of the filing of the petition. Thereafter, the secured
creditor’s rights to the value of the collateral are given “adequate protec-
tion,”75 which effectively means that while the secured creditor does not
realize any increases in the value of the collateral (assuming the auto-
matic stay precludes taking the collateral), the secured creditor is also
given protection—apart from the time value of delay—against any dimi-
nution in the value of the collateral during the bankruptcy proceeding.
If the loan contract was not yet funded, the debtor would not be able
to assume or assign the loan, which means that both parties would be off
the hook with respect to the loan.76 To the extent that the nondebtor
party could show damages resulting from this effective rejection of the
executory contract, that party would have a claim for those damages val-
ued as of the date of the filing of the petition. For simplicity’s sake, these
contracts will be called “loan contracts.”
Second are what can be described as standard executory contracts,
with unfulfilled obligations on both sides. While there is a complica-
tion—and, hence, a third category—that will be discussed next, the pro-
totype we are thinking about here is a standard commercial contract,
such as a contract to buy and sell widgets, with delivery and payment both
occurring in the future. Under Bankruptcy Code section 365, the debtor
is given two kinds of choices with respect to such contracts. First, the
debtor may either “assume” or “reject” the contract,77 and may do so at
any time during the bankruptcy case unless, on motion, the court orders
the decision to be made at an earlier point.78 If the debtor rejects the
contract, it is presumably because the debtor views the contract as bur-
densome—i.e., in the example above, because the debtor believes that
the widgets are not as valuable as the amount the debtor had contracted
73. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) (noting, in such circumstances all unsecured claimants
will receive “interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the petition”).
74. Id. § 506(a).
75. See id. §§ 361, 362(d)(1) (stating what constitutes “adequate protection” and
when it is required).
76. Id. § 365(c)(2).
77. Id. § 365(a). If the debtor wishes to assume a contract or lease, it must “cure[ ], or
provide[ ] adequate assurance that [it] will promptly cure” any default, compensate the
other party for any losses, and “provide[ ] adequate assurance of future performance.” Id.
§ 365(b).
78. Id. § 365(d)(1). As the discussion in the text suggests, the debtor generally has
considerable discretion when it makes its decision whether to assume or reject a contract
or lease. One of the few exceptions is nonresidential leases, which are subject to a 120-day
limit. Id. § 365(d)(4).
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to pay for them. If the debtor assumes the contract, it is presumably be-
cause the debtor views the contract as valuable—i.e., in the example
above, the widgets to be delivered are more valuable than the payment
obligation for them—and the contract is treated as if it is one made by
the debtor-in-possession (an “expense of administration”). In the case of
assumption, the debtor has a second choice. If the debtor does not have a
need for the completed contract, but nonetheless views it as valuable, the
debtor may “assign” the contract to another party; upon assignment, the
other party, and not the debtor, is on the hook with respect to perform-
ance.79 Both assumption and assignment can be accomplished despite
any contractual provision that is considered to be an ipso facto clause;
that is, a clause providing that the contract is breached (or terminated)
because of “the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any
time before the closing of the case” or “the commencement of a case
under this title.”80 These provisions may not be perfect. They seem to, for
example, give the debtor a one-way option during the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding to see if the contract turns out to be valuable. The other party to
the contract may be faced during this interregnum with a decision
whether to continue to work on the contract at some expense to that
party.81 But our point is more basic: For this kind of contract, these rules,
whether entirely “fair” or not, are clear and apply across the board.82
These contracts will be called “classic executory contracts.”
There is a third category—a variation on the second—that is exem-
plified by classic insurance contracts as well as real estate leases. In these
contracts, even if the debtor does not ultimately assume the contract, the
debtor receives a “use” benefit during the period between the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy case and a decision to assume or reject the con-
tract. A debtor that uses real property during a bankruptcy proceeding
should be required to pay for that use, irrespective of any ultimate deci-
sion to assume or reject.83 Similarly, a debtor whose building is insured
should be required to pay for that insurance coverage during a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, again irrespective of any ultimate decision to assume
or reject.
The Bankruptcy Code is fully consistent with this intuition. In the
case of nonresidential real property leases, the debtor is required to
79. Id. § 365(f)(2) (requiring debtor or trustee to satisfy requirements for assumption
and provide “adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee” as prerequisites
to assignment).
80. Id. § 365(e)(1)(A)–(B). The assignee, however, would otherwise need to comply
with the terms of the contract.
81. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Cases, Problems, and Materials on
Bankruptcy 278 (2d ed. 1990) (describing parties’ incentives during this period).
82. In the situations we just noted, the other party’s major remedy is to seek a court
order requiring the debtor to assume or reject the contract. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2).
83. See, e.g., Thompson v. IFG Leasing Co. (In re Thompson), 788 F.2d 560, 563 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding when debtor used property prior to rejection, the “fair and reasonable
value” of property is an administrative expense).
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“timely perform all [of its] obligations . . . until such lease is assumed or
rejected.”84 In other cases, such as the case of insurance coverage, the
debtor’s “use” of the coverage prior to a decision to assume or reject
would give rise to an administrative expense claim at market value.85
Apart from this issue of paying for the “use” of property (or coverage)
during the period prior to the decision to assume or reject, these con-
tracts are treated in parallel with what we are calling classic executory
contracts. For want of a better term, they will be called “insurance-like
executory contracts.”
We can now “map” derivatives, repos, and other financial contracts
to these categories. As we do so, it will become apparent that not all finan-
cial contracts have the same kinds of underlying attributes. This analysis
highlights the treatment that each would receive in bankruptcy, which
forms the foundation for an examination as to whether and why that
treatment is insufficient.
For bankruptcy purposes, repos and swaps, the principal financial
contracts, have very different characteristics. Repos are in essence se-
cured loans. Under the analysis above, they would accordingly belong in
the category of classic loans. A second, conceptually quite different, type
of contract is epitomized by swaps and various other forms of derivatives.
At their core, they ordinarily are hedges—analytically indistinguishable
from a contract to purchase widgets on June 1st at a certain price86—and
comfortably fit within the category of classic executory contracts.87 As ex-
ecutory contracts, they could (were they treated similarly to other con-
tracts in bankruptcy) be assumed and assigned irrespective of ipso facto
clauses. Those that function like an insurance policy would be given the
additional protection of payments for the use of the “insurance” during
the pendency of the bankruptcy case.
The following section unpacks the basic treatment of repos and
swaps under a transaction consistency norm in more detail, before turn-
ing to the other two core bankruptcy policies that are elided with these
contracts: setoff and the trustee’s avoidance powers.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3).
85. We have to assume the debtor is in fact using the coverage, as indeed would be the
case prior to a rejection. If the building is insured, and there is no fire, the debtor would,
at the end of the coverage period, reject the contract; if, however, there was a fire, the
debtor would, at that point, assume the contract. Given that, it is clear that, in reality, the
debtor is “using” the coverage during that interregnum.
86. This tension was revealed with the question of whether a natural gas distributor’s
supply contracts with its customers should be characterized as swaps for purposes of
bankruptcy’s special rules. Hutson v. Smithfield Packing Co. (In re Nat’l Gas Distribs.
LLC), 369 B.R. 884, 900 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007), rev’d sub nom., Hutson v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. (In re Nat’l Gas Distribs. LLC), 556 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2009). Analytically,
it is both a standard commodities contract and a hedge, and it would be strange to have this
characterization turn on the “primary purpose” or some such thing.
87. As we discuss in more detail below, in the event that a swap is embedded in, or
used as, a loan, it should be treated as a financial accommodation. See infra notes 123–125 R
and accompanying text (discussing loan-like swaps).
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B. How Would (and Should) Repos be Treated?
1. Repos as Secured Loans. — When Lehman’s examiner released his
lengthy report on Lehman’s fall, press coverage immediately centered on
a hitherto unknown pattern of transactions that Lehman employees
dubbed “Repo 105.”88 These transactions provide a useful context for
more carefully exploring the treatment of repos.
As discussed earlier, Lehman arranged a series of repos shortly
before the close of each quarter.89 The repos consisted of sales by
Lehman of securities that Lehman would repurchase at a specified price
after the end of the quarter. The 105 in “Repo 105” is a shorthand refer-
ence to Lehman’s interpretation of the underlying accounting rule. So
long as the securities used in the repo were worth at least 105% of the
cash paid by the repo buyer, Lehman interpreted the relevant accounting
rule to permit the transaction to be booked as a sale rather than a loan.90
Treating the Repo 105s as sales rather than as secured loans enabled
Lehman to remove them from its balance sheet debt and thereby to re-
duce its apparent leverage ratio, with the result of making Lehman look
less risky than it actually was.91
As the examiner pointed out, Repo 105 treatment was entirely artifi-
cial. Regardless whether the securities were worth more or less than 105%
of the cash received, repos were functionally identical to an ordinary
loan, with the securities as collateral. Under ordinary principles of se-
cured transactions, the repos would be characterized as secured transac-
tions.92 This conclusion can be stated with confidence because American
88. See Valukas Report, supra note 49, at 732–1053. As noted earlier, Ernst & Young R
has been charged with having known about the Repo 105 transactions and having
acquiesced in them. See supra note 49. Press coverage was immediate. See, e.g., Jacob R
Goldstein, Repo 105: Lehman’s ‘Accounting Gimmick’ Explained, NPR (Mar. 12, 2010,
11:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2010/03/repo_105_lehmans_accounting_
gi.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 49–50 (describing use of repos to reduce R
Lehman’s reported debt).
90. See Valukas Report, supra note 49, at 754–57 (discussing Lehman’s use of R
Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
140 (“SFAS 140”) to characterize Repo 105 transactions as sales). Repos are ordinarily
treated as loans for accounting purposes. But SFAS 140 allows the repo seller to
characterize a report as a sale if specified criteria are met. See Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140: Accounting for Transfers and
Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities ¶ 98 (2000). Lehman’s
interpretation of this was that a sale characterization would be appropriate if the securities
conveyed to the buyer were worth at least 105% of the cash paid by the buyer.
91. According to the Lehman examiner, Lehman used $38.6 billion in Repo 105s in
fourth quarter 2007, $49.1 billion in first quarter 2008, and $50.38 billion in second
quarter 2008. The transactions reduced its reported leverage from an actual ratio of
17.8 dollars of debt for every dollar of equity to a reported debt-to-equity ratio of 16.1; 17.3
to 15.4; and 13.9 to 12.1 in these three quarters. Valukas Report, supra note 49, at 748. R
92. For a nice analysis of this point from early in the evolution of the repo market, see
Gary Walters, Note, Repurchase Agreements and the Bankruptcy Code: The Need for
Legislative Action, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 828, 838–40 (1984) (noting repo transactions are
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commercial law—principally as reflected in the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.)—has a deeply entrenched commitment to piercing
through formal labels and defining transactions in terms of their actual
form. A key gatekeeping provision of Article 9 explicitly states, for in-
stance, that “a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security
interest in personal property or fixtures by contract” will be treated as a
secured transaction.93
To be sure, it is not always obvious whether a transaction that takes
on some of the attributes of a loan should be characterized as a secured
transaction. In some cases, the drafters of the U.C.C. have simplified the
analysis by explicitly defining a transaction that takes the form of a sale as
a secured transaction; in other cases, the termination has been left to
judicial discretion. Sales of accounts under a “factoring” arrangement are
the best known example of the first strategy;94 and the case law address-
ing whether a debtor’s sale of identified assets (such as credit card receiv-
ables or mortgages) as part of a securitization transaction should be
deemed a true sale is the most important example of the second.95
The “true sale” cases put our analysis of repos into stark relief. The
originators’ objective in a securitization transaction is to ensure that the
sale of assets will be treated as a true sale rather than a secured transac-
tion, and thus is “bankruptcy remote” if the debtor later files for bank-
ruptcy. To achieve this result, the debtor is required to relinquish any
like loans in that buyers generally pay less than securities’ market value and sellers usually
receive securities’ interest or other distributions). The leading article in this area takes the
opposite view. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Repo Madness: The Characterization of
Repurchase Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C., 46 Syracuse L. Rev.
999, 1018 (1996) [hereinafter Schroeder, Repo Madness] (arguing repos do not qualify as
secured transactions since they lack tangible “res”). It may be worth noting, however, that
the author, a top commercial law scholar, starts from the premise that the “repo market is
simply too enormous and important” to run the risk that repos might be recharacterized as
loans, and sets out to find a strong argument for this conclusion. Id. at 1014.
93. U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (2011). In a much discussed recent case, a bankruptcy judge
determined that the characterization of repos should turn on the parties’ “objective
intent,” and that this created an issue of material fact, in part because the repo buyer was
required to “transfer the same, not merely equivalent, securities.” In re Criimi Mae, Inc.,
251 B.R. 796, 800–05 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000).
94. Sales of accounts are defined as secured transactions and brought within Article 9
by U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3).
95. In a securitization, a firm sells accounts receivable or other assets to a new entity
created for the purposes of the transaction, often as a means of generating financing for
the firm’s business. If the transaction is not a “true sale,” it could be recharacterized as a
secured loan and the assets treated as part of the bankruptcy case if the firm later files for
bankruptcy. So long as it is a true sale, on the other hand, the transaction will be
“bankruptcy remote.” See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The
Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1553, 1564 (2008)
(discussing bankruptcy remote, securitization, and some of the controversy securitization
has engendered); see also Edward J. Janger, The Costs of Liquidity Enhancement:
Transparency Cost, Risk Alteration and Coordination Problems, 4 Brooklyn J. Corp. Fin. &
Com. L. 39, 44 (2010) (“[C]ertainty that the assets have been subject to a true sale has
been hard to come by.”).
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interest in the assets that are sold. Repos, by contrast, have precisely the
opposite intent. The parties fully contemplate that the debtor will reac-
quire the securities used in the repo transaction by tendering the speci-
fied price—which is functionally indistinguishable from a loan
repayment.96
Leases and sale-leaseback arrangements complicate the analysis, but
only a little. Although structured as a lease, or as a sale followed by a lease
from the buyer back to the seller, these transactions often function like
loan transactions. Article 2A of the U.C.C. provides extensive rules for
leasing arrangements, but largely leaves the determination of whether the
transaction is a “true” lease or a disguised secured loan to judicial deci-
sion.97 Courts have tended to focus on factors such as whether the lessee/
debtor is required to make more than a nominal payment if it wishes to
purchase the assets at the end of the lease.98
Repos are far more like a secured loan than either a securitization or
a sale-leaseback transaction. The repo seller is, for instance, fully ex-
pected to pay the specified amount and to reacquire the securities that
are the subject matter of the transaction. The “haircut”—that is, the dif-
ference between the current value of the securities and the amount of
credit extended to the debtor—is functionally equivalent to negotiations
between a debtor and its lender over the amount of collateral collateraliz-
ing a loan. Moreover, if the repo seller fails to perform, and the repo
buyer sells the securities, the repo buyer ordinarily must return any ex-
cess over the intended repurchase price to the repo seller.99
96. Many of the standard terms of repo contracts underscore this intention. The repo
seller, rather than the buyer, is typically entitled to any interest payments or other proceeds
of the securities during the pendency of the contract. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, A
Repo Opera: How Criimi Mae Got Repos Backwards, 76 Am. Bankr. L.J. 565, 571 (2002)
[hereinafter Schroeder, A Repo Opera] (“[R]epos typically provide that the repo seller is
the owner of all interest and other distributions made on the underlying security pending
the repurchase.”); see also Bond Mkt. Ass’n & Int’l Capital Mkt. Ass’n, Global Master
Repurchase Agreement (2000) [hereinafter Global Master Repurchase Agreement],
available at http://www.icmagroup.org/ICMAGroup/files/25/25561a36-72bc-439d-8538-
039a3a979b03.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing standard master
agreement for repo transactions based on English law).
97. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(j) (defining “lease” as “a transfer of the right to
possession and use of goods for a term in return for consideration,” but excluding without
defining “a sale, including a sale on approval or a sale or return, or retention or creation of
a security interest”).
98. A nominal repurchase price suggests that the transaction really is a loan. For a
survey of cases that had arisen under Article 2A as of the early 1990s, see generally Robert
D. Strauss et al., Leases, 47 Bus. Law. 1545 (1992).
99. Repo sellers like Lehman recognize that their repo transactions are loans and
regularly treat them as such for accounting purposes. The Lehman examiner highlighted
this fact in his criticism of Lehman’s Repo 105 transactions. “Like other large investment
banks,” he reported, “Lehman engaged, on a daily basis, in tens of billions of dollars of
repo transactions in its normal course of business for financing purposes.” Valukas Report,
supra note 49, at 751. In contrast with its Repo 105s, “Lehman accounted for these R
ordinary repo transactions as financing transactions.” Id.
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The one feature of many repos that might seem to call the conclu-
sion that they function as secured transactions into question is the repo
buyer’s option under many repo contracts to return either the original
securities or equivalent substitute securities.100 This makes the ostensible
collateral of the transaction more nebulous than with a traditional se-
cured loan.101 The fungibility concern only applies to repos that do not
require return of the original collateral.102 While the possibility that the
repo buyer will return different (though comparable) collateral raises
questions about the parties’ respective entitlements that we consider in
our discussion of rehypothecation below, it does not alter their status as
loans rather than sales.
This reasoning reveals a striking irony in Lehman’s interpretation of
the accounting rule that spawned its Repo 105 transactions. Although re-
pos of all kinds are essentially secured loans, a repo involving securities
worth more than 105% of the amount of credit extended looks even more
like a secured transaction than a sale. This is because the debtor has an
even stronger incentive to reacquire the securities if they are much more
valuable than the cash advance than if they are worth less. The repo
buyer in such a transaction is like a heavily overcollateralized secured
creditor. From this perspective, using the requirements of Repo 105 to
determine whether a repo is a sale gets things precisely backwards.
2. Transaction Consistency for Repos. — If repos were construed as
loans by a bankruptcy court and they were subject to the same core bank-
ruptcy rules that apply to other secured transactions, how would they be
treated in bankruptcy? The short answer, as will become evident, is that
their treatment would change only in limited respects.
The first thing to note, as mentioned earlier, is that repos would be
automatically “breached” as of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
and the claim and the value of the collateral would be determined as of
that moment.103 From that point forward, the debtor would have no fur-
100. See, e.g., Global Master Repurchase Agreement, supra note 96, ¶ 3(f) (requiring R
return of “equivalent securities” on repurchase date); see also Schroeder, A Repo Opera,
supra note 96, at 571 (“[T]he repo buyer . . . is typically entitled to deal with the security R
and is only required to sell back an equivalent security.”).
101. The absence of clearly identifiable collateral is the central plank in Jeanne
Schroeder’s argument that repos are best treated as sales rather than secured loans. See
Schroeder, Repo Madness, supra note; see also supra note 92 (discussing Schroeder’s R
argument and counterarguments).
102. See, e.g., In re Criimi Mae, Inc., 251 B.R. 796, 803–04 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000)
(finding ambiguity as to whether repo at issue was sale or secured transaction, and
emphasizing requirement that specific collateral be returned weighed in favor of treating it
as secured transaction).
103. Kimberly Summe has argued that repos and derivatives would present insoluble
valuation issues. Kimberly Anne Summe, Lessons Learned from the Lehman Bankruptcy,
in Ending Government Bailouts as We Know Them 59, 94 (Kenneth E. Scott, George P.
Shultz & John B. Taylor eds., 2010) (“Complex derivatives such as credit default swaps on
asset-backed securities or collateralized debt obligations presented a major challenge for
valuation when markets began to fall apart.”). This, however, is a necessary part of any
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ther obligation to post collateral, but would need to provide adequate
protection for the collateral’s value as of the filing of the petition.104 The
counterparty could exercise recoupment rights, and would have rights of
setoff, although it would need relief from the automatic stay in order to
exercise the statutorily recognized setoff right.105
With the possible exception of requiring the counterparty to gain
court permission before exercising its setoff rights, we find this treatment
unexceptional. To the extent the collateral was insufficient, the
counterparty would be unsecured and would need to stand in line with
other unsecured creditors. The essential point is that the counterparty
knows its situation as of the moment of bankruptcy and can proceed
accordingly.
We do think that, to the extent the repo buyer (or its agent) is in
possession of collateral, it should be able to quickly realize on this collat-
eral. In most cases, the collateral is either cash or cash-like, highly liquid,
assets.106 In those cases, there are few, if any, reasons for delay. Valuation
disputes are minimal to nonexistent when the collateral is cash or cash-
like, and there is nothing “firm-specific” about the collateral, meaning
that the ordinary justification for the automatic stay as applied to secured
creditors simply does not exist.107 Indeed, if done as a matter of recoup-
termination; Summe suggests it is a reason to reconsider whether complex derivatives are
suitable for a mark-to-market model. Id.
104. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d)(1) (2006) (stating what constitutes adequate
protection and when it is required).
105. See id. § 362(a)(7) (providing that filing of petition operates as stay of “the setoff
of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under
this title against any claim against the debtor”). The right of setoff is expressly recognized
and is generally treated as the equivalent of a secured claim that existed at the time of the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id. § 553. If the off-set arises out of the same transaction,
it has been considered a “recoupment,” not a “setoff,” and is thus not subject to § 553 or
§ 362(a)(7). See In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding
transaction was recoupment rather than setoff and “[a]s such, it was neither a voidable
preference nor a violation of the automatic stay”).
106. This is particularly so in the wake of the 2008 crisis, which has prompted a shift
back to cash-like collateral for derivatives and sharply diminished repos based on
mortgage-backed securities and other less liquidate collateral. See, e.g., Adam Copeland,
Antoine Martin & Michael Walker, The Tri-Party Repo Market Before the 2010 Reforms 46
(Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Reports, Staff Report No. 477, Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr477.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“The composition of assets used as collateral has changed somewhat, with more
liquid collateral being substituted for less liquid collateral. The amount of Non Fed-eligible
collateral more than halved between July 2008 and July 2009, falling from $600 billion to
less than $300 billion . . . .”).
107. The debtor’s need for liquidity, particularly acute for a financial institution that
hopes to reorganize, does not undermine this conclusion. This is so because liquidity
needs do not make cash or cash-like collateral “firm-specific.” Rather, liquidity needs
should be addressed through debtor-in-possession financing. While not the subject of this
Essay, both authors are participants in (and Jackson is principal drafter for) a Hoover
Institution working group that has formed a proposal for the bankruptcies of the largest
financial institutions. Included in that proposal are various modifications to bankruptcy’s
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-1\COL104.txt unknown Seq: 27  3-JAN-12 7:45
178 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:152
ment—that is, closing out on a single repo contract itself—the
Bankruptcy Code would allow the counterparty to proceed without first
going to court.108 For repo creditors that do not have a right of recoup-
ment, an exception could be created for such contracts from first need-
ing court permission to sell cash and cash-like collateral in its possession
or there could be a presumption of a quick determination upon a motion
being made. In either case, the “exceptions,” if such they are, to current
bankruptcy rules are, at most, minor.109
If this analysis is correct, it suggests that the pernicious effects of the
Bankruptcy Code’s special treatment of repos are subtler than many sug-
gest. The special treatment did not radically alter a repo lender’s incen-
tive to monitor the debtor, for instance.110 In the Bear Stearns and
Lehman debacles, repo lenders (unlike swaps counterparties, as shown
above) monitored aggressively and indeed took advantage of their special
status.
But the special treatment did encourage excessive use of repos,
rather than more traditional forms of secured finance, in several ways.
First, the special treatment of repos eliminated delays in exiting the cor-
responding contract, thus enhancing the attractiveness of repos for fi-
standard rules and procedures for debtor-in-possession financing for such institutions. See
Thomas H. Jackson et al., Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: Orderly Liquidation
Authority and a New Chapter 14 (April 25, 2011) [hereinafter Jackson, et. al., Chapter 14
Proposal] (unpublished manuscript), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/
files/documents/Resolution-Project-Booklet-4-11.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). Requiring a counterparty in possession of cash or cash-like collateral to turn it
over to the debtor is, as a matter of both principle and existing procedures, extremely
dubious as a source of liquidity. A hearing would be necessary prior to transfer under
§ 542(e) and/or before the collateral could be used by the debtor per § 363(a) and (c)(2).
11 U.S.C. §§ 363(a), 363(c)(2), 542(e). Moreover, upon turn-over, the counterparty would
have to be given adequate protection, id. § 361, which effectively is the requirement for
senior-most debtor-in-possession financing. Id. § 364(d). In every other situation, such
financing can only be used if “the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise.” Id.
§ 364(d)(1)(A). For these reasons, liquidity needs of financial institutions are not a reason
to deviate from the idea that cash and cash-like collateral in the possession of a
counterparty should not be subject to the automatic stay.
108. For a discussion on recoupment doctrine and its implications for repos and
derivatives below, see infra notes 150–154 and accompanying text. R
109. For a discussion of the application of preference law and other trustee avoidance
powers, see infra Part II.E. It is worth noting that the prices even of cash-like collateral may
be volatile under extraordinary market conditions, as with some Treasury bonds in 2008.
See, e.g., Stan Luxenberg, After a Rollercoaster Year, Are TIPS Attractive?, Registered Rep.
(Apr. 5, 2010, 3:31 PM), http://registeredrep.com/investing/fixedincome/tips_little_
inlation_yet0403/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing volatility of Treasury
Inflation-Protected Securities). This still would not call for a stay, however, because the
value at any given time still is less likely to be subject to uncertainty than with more opaque
or firm-specific collateral.
110. We thus part ways with the analysis of Mark Roe, whose fine article we are
otherwise in full accord with, on this point. See Roe, supra note 47, at 541 (arguing special R
treatment reduced incentive of repo lender to monitor debtor).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-1\COL104.txt unknown Seq: 28  3-JAN-12 7:45
2012] TRANSACTION CONSISTENCY 179
nancing as compared to less volatile sources of funding.111 Second, the
special treatment in bankruptcy may have invited the characterization of
repos as sales for purposes such as Lehman’s Repo 105 transactions.112
Third, although not directly linked to their special status in bankruptcy,
repos enjoy automatic perfection, which removes the transaction costs of
perfecting an ordinary secured loan.113
Reversing the special treatment of repos would reduce these distor-
tions without dramatically changing the practical status of repos in bank-
ruptcy.114 To be sure, even a small change may have costs.115 For exam-
ple, the marginal reductions in benefits could induce repo lenders to
insist on larger haircuts. Moreover, even a tiny difference in a repo
lender’s ability to exercise its rights and sell its collateral in bankruptcy
could increase the risk of runs on a financially precarious repo debtor
prior to bankruptcy.116
In our view, each of these costs would be well addressed by our pro-
posal to exempt repos that are collateralized by cash or cash-like securi-
ties from the automatic stay. Allowing the lender to assert immediate con-
trol over cash collateral would protect the most important class of repos
without jeopardizing collateral that the debtor needs for the Chapter 11
process. Although repos collateralized by other, more opaque, forms of
collateral, and thus subject to a stay, could become more costly, and some
current lenders might be less able to participate in these transactions,117
these effects are altogether appropriate given the risks posed by these
repos and the benefits of a stay.118
111. See supra notes 34–38, 41–42 and accompanying text (discussing motives for R
special treatment, including elimination of delay).
112. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (examining Lehman’s 105 R
transactions).
113. Where a repo is recharacterized as a secured transaction, as we argue it should
be, U.C.C. § 9-309(10) provides automatic perfection. See U.C.C. § 9-309(10) (2011).
114. It would not alter the ease of perfecting the security interest, because U.C.C. § 9-
309(10) would continue to provide automatic perfection. For an argument that repos
should be subject to a filing requirement if their special bankruptcy treatment is retained,
see Enrico Perotti, Systemic Liquidity Risk and Bankruptcy Exceptions 4 (Ctr. for Econ.
Policy Research, Policy Insight No. 52, 2010), available at www.cepr.org/pubs/policyin
sights/policyInsight52.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
115. As our friend and colleague Darrell Duffie has repeatedly reminded us.
116. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (presenting this argument). R
117. Money market funds, for instance, are limited to investments that can be
liquidated quickly. See generally Adam Copeland, Darrell Duffie, Antoine Martin & Susan
McLaughlin, Policy Issues in the Design of Tri-Party Repo Markets 20 (Hoover Inst.,
Working Paper No. 55, Jul. 2011), available at http://www.darrellduffie.com/uploads/
working/CopelandDuffieMartinMcLaughlin_Working_July%2023_2011.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (noting “revisions of Rule 2a7 of the Investment Company Act,
designed to lower risks to money market funds, push those funds into shorter-term
assets”).
118. The proposal outlined in the text could easily be coordinated with Acharya and
Oncu’s recent proposal to establish a resolution authority for repos that are collateralized
by opaque collateral. Viral V. Acharya & T. Sabri Oncu, The Repurchase Agreement
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3. Rehypothecation. — Rather than simply hold or control the securi-
ties it receives in a repo transaction, the repo buyer frequently employs
them in additional transactions. This widespread practice—which is the
rehypothecation referred to in the last section—adds a further wrinkle to
the treatment of repo (and derivatives) transactions in bankruptcy.119
One might plausibly conclude that rehypothecation—or even the
right of rehypothecation, whether or not it is exercised—transforms a
repo from a lending transaction to a sale. In our view, however, jumping
to this conclusion misconstrues the nature of the underlying transaction.
Even if the securities are rehypothecated, the transaction is still funda-
mentally a loan. While most secured transactions involve identifiable col-
lateral that does not shift form, not all do. The collateral in an inventory
loan is continuously shifting, for instance, and there is no limit on the
number of subsequent parties who can take a property interest in the
collateral in an ordinary loan.120
This last point presents the real issue with rehypothecation. The
question is not whether rehypothecated securities cease to be loans. The
real issue is the parties’ respective entitlements if one or more fails to
perform. If the debtor (the repo seller) consents to rehypothecation, it
essentially relinquishes any rights against a subsequent buyer or recipient
of a security interest in the securities from the lender (repo buyer), but
the transaction is no less a loan. The conclusion that the debtor’s only
recourse is against its lender, the original buyer, under these circum-
stances is in fact entirely consistent with the current rules in Articles 8
and 9.121 It is confusing only because of the multiple departures from
transaction consistency in the characterization and treatment of repos.
C. How Would (and Should) Swaps and Other Derivatives Be Treated?
Because of the range of functions they serve, the treatment of swaps
under core bankruptcy principles would be more variegated than with
repos. While most swaps would be characterized as ordinary executory
(Repo) Market, in Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture
of Global Finance 319, 345–46 (Viral V. Acharya, Thomas F. Cooley, Matthew P.
Richardson & Ingo Walter eds., 2010). Under their proposal, a new authority would make
initial payments to a debtor’s repo counterparties and would subsequently liquidate the
collateral. Id. A stay on seizing or selling the collateral would facilitate this process.
119. For an in-depth description of rehypothecation as well as an account of the
historical context and an analysis of current patterns, see generally Kenneth C. Kettering,
Repledge Deconstructed, 61 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 45 (1999).
120. See, e.g., Schroeder, Repo Madness, supra note 92, at 1023 (using security R
interest in grain in which secured creditor is not required to give back grain as example of
inventory loan). A standard repo contract with fungible securities—such as treasury
bonds—is quite similar.
121. See U.C.C. §§ 8-502, 8-510(a) (2011); see also Christian A. Johnson, Derivatives
and Rehypothecation Failure: It’s 3:00 PM, Do You Know Where Your Collateral Is?, 39
Ariz. L. Rev. 949, 980 (1997) (concluding any party that expressly permits rehypothecation
“has in substance subordinated its rights in the posted collateral to the third party”).
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contracts, swaps are also used for financing and different kinds of insur-
ance purposes (in the latter case they would be insurance-like executory
contracts in our typology).
Start with the use of swaps for financing, which is the least intuitive,
least common, and most easily dealt with function of swaps. Although
swaps are not ordinarily envisioned as financing instruments, they have
this purpose in some transactions. Consider an unlikely swaps borrower:
Italy. To spruce up its balance sheet as it prepared to join the European
Union, Italy entered into a massive swap transaction with J.P. Morgan
Chase.122 In form, the contract was a standard swap based on the relation-
ship between the value of the lira and the London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR).123 By undervaluing the lira by 44%, however, the parties
transformed it into a loan that Italy would be required to pay at the end
of the contract term.124
While the size and purpose of the transaction were extraordinary,
lenders also sometimes use swaps for more ordinary purposes. Contracts
taking this form would be construed as “financial accommodations” in
bankruptcy, and thus would be subject to the same treatment as repos.125
Like repos and other loans, they would be automatically terminated when
the debtor filed for bankruptcy, and the debtor would not be permitted
to assume the contract. Our proposed amendment to this treatment also
would stand for loan-like swaps. The automatic stay should apply to most
collateral, but it should not interfere with sales of cash or cash-like collat-
eral by the debtor’s counterparty.
Most swaps would fall into the second category. Because they entail
ongoing obligations by both sides, even the most exotic swap is simply an
ordinary executory contract for bankruptcy purposes. The most trouble-
some feature of this result is that, as noted earlier, it may give a debtor
time to speculate without consequence (if the hedge turns out to be “in
the money,” the debtor assumes; if the hedge turns out to be a bad deal,
the debtor rejects).126 As the discussion on netting and setoff below indi-
cates, the risk of strategic assume-or-reject decisions is mitigated consider-
122. See, e.g., Benn Steil, Op-Ed., Enron and Italy: Parallels Between Rome’s Efforts
to Qualify for Euro Entry and the Financial Chicanery in Texas, Council on Foreign
Relations (Feb. 21, 2002), http://www.cfr.org/italy/enron-italy-parallels-between-romes-
efforts-qualify-euro-entry-financial-chicanery-texas/p4455 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing transaction and comparing it to transactions used by Enron).
123. The London Interbank Offered Rate is the interest rate at which banks lend to
one another.
124. There obviously was no guaranty that the swap would retain its value for J.P.
Morgan, given the inevitable fluctuations in the value of the lira and LIBOR. But J.P.
Morgan could lock in the value by hedging against the fluctuations if it wished to protect
itself.
125. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (2006).
126. See supra text accompanying note 21 (noting “debtor’s ability to pick the good R
swaps and abandon the bad ones”).
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ably if the debtor and its counterparty have a master netting agreement,
as they often will. But it does not disappear.127
While strategic use of the debtor’s executory contract powers is a
conceptual concern with all classic executory contracts, it may have par-
ticular bite in transactions that are themselves designed, explicitly, as
hedges rather than as the buying and selling of a good. The Bankruptcy
Code is not wholly consistent in how it currently treats this concern with
respect to executory contracts in other contexts. For example, much of
the undesirable nature of the delay option is mitigated by a requirement
of compliance with the terms of the lease prior to assumption or rejec-
tion, and § 365(d) sets time limits on the debtor’s decision in cases of
unexpired leases of nonresidential real property where the debtor is the
lessee.128 But the debtor does have considerable flexibility whether and
when to assume or reject. Given the likely reality that the parties to swaps
and derivatives are sophisticated players, and particularly with an assump-
tion of court expertise, a short period in which to assume or reject is
desirable. Whether it needs to be mandated in the Bankruptcy Code or
left to court decisions based on the request of a counterparty—but with a
presumption that the period should not be long—is an issue discussed
below.
There are arguments that derivatives, unlike repos, have special rea-
sons to be exempted from the automatic stay—in the sense of allowing
the counterparty to terminate without waiting for an assumption or rejec-
tion decision of the debtor. Thus, in the words of one leading expert:
The application of an automatic stay, while appearing to pre-
serve the value of the “assets” of the failing entity, may be illu-
sory as it relates to derivatives since derivative transactions and
the collateral associated with those transactions are not really
assets in the traditional sense, and the preservation of value may
rapidly change, particularly in a distressed market. . . . Highly
liquid derivative transactions, such as interest rate and foreign
exchange derivatives (which constitute 80 percent of the
$600 trillion notional value over-the-counter derivative market),
were terminated by many of Lehman Brothers’ counterparties
after the investment bank’s failure, allowing those counterpar-
ties to reduce potential losses by entering into replacement
transactions. The loss of an ability to hedge one’s trading book
because of the application of a stay would result in significant
losses for qualified financial contract counterparties, causing a
catastrophic decline in the activities of the financial markets.129
These arguments, however, have several weaknesses. First, derivatives
certainly can have significant value—and hence are “assets”—of the
127. See infra Part II.D.
128. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (setting time limit to 120 days). There are also time
limits for such a decision on residential real property or personal property in Chapter 7.
Id. § 365(d)(1).
129. Summe, supra note 103, at 82 (footnote omitted). R
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debtor (precisely the reason behind permitting an assumption or rejec-
tion decision in the first place); the fact that their value may change rap-
idly is a feature, not a reason to distinguish them from “assets in the tradi-
tional sense.”130 Second, an argument about the inability of a
counterparty to hedge its books during the period before the debtor de-
cides to assume or reject, even if true,131 would have significant force only
if there were systemic concerns, and thus would essentially focus on sys-
temically important debtors, not all debtors. Third, even in these cases,
some of these consequences might be mitigated either through the crea-
tive entering into of replacement transactions (themselves hedged) or
requests for a strict timetable on the assumption or rejection decision.132
Finally, if the swap is collateralized, the counterparty most likely would be
entitled to payments to the extent the collateral declined in value after
the bankruptcy petition was filed, as noted earlier.133
Still another argument for forgoing a stay centers on the “runability”
of swaps. If swap counterparties anticipate being treated less favorably in-
side than outside of bankruptcy, the reasoning goes, they will run as soon
as they detect the prospect of bankruptcy. The counterparty to a swap
may not seem to have as great a capacity to run as a bank depositor; a
swap counterparty cannot simply cancel its contract and grab whatever it
is owed at any time, any more than a bondholder or other creditor can.
But the structure of the derivatives market makes it easy for counterpar-
ties to achieve the same effect. Suppose, for instance, that Bank of
America (BOA) and Goldman Sachs have a currency swap that requires
Bank of America to deliver $1.3 million and Goldman to deliver C= 1 mil-
lion in six months. If it catches wind of a possible BOA bankruptcy,
Goldman could ask BOA to enter into a second, offsetting swap that calls
for BOA to deliver C= 1 million and Goldman $1.3 million on the same
date as the original contract. Alternatively, and perhaps more likely,
130. It is the case that interest rate swaps are, in fact, diminished in importance in
bankruptcy, since (for the most part) debtors do not make interest payments, on pre-
petition debt at least, during the bankruptcy case. Ayotte & Skeel, Bailouts, supra note 68, R
at 496 n.136. Even so, to the extent they have value, because of a hedge that is “in the
money,” it is an element bargained for by the debtor, and hence, analytically, a proper
asset of the estate.
131. Given that the original derivatives contract was a hedge, the probability (or risk)
of an assumption or rejection would logically be directly related to the relative values of the
currencies, interest rates, or other underlying factor on which the original derivatives
contract was based. Because of that direct correlation, it would seem entirely possible to
hedge against the possibility of either assumption or rejection (or both).
132. The counterparty can minimize risk by “limiting its exposure to any given
debtor, . . . and . . . sell[ing] a duplicative hedge to a third party. Moreover, the uncertainty
could be reduced under a rule that required the debtor to make prompt decisions on
assumption, much as bank regulators do in a bank insolvency.” Skeel, Bankruptcy, supra
note 63, at 17–18 n.84. R
133. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing protection given to R
secured creditors after bankruptcy filing against any diminution in value of collateral
during subsequent bankruptcy proceedings).
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Goldman could enter into the second swap with another, healthier
counterparty. Either way, the second swap would eliminate its exposure
to BOA. Widespread exit could cripple a financial institution that is not
in fact insolvent, much as a bank run can cripple an otherwise healthy
bank.
As noted earlier, we believe that the risk of runs is indeed the most
serious concern with transaction consistency for financial contracts.134
But here, too, the concerns do not seem great enough to justify complete
insulation from core bankruptcy principles. A swap counterparty can pro-
tect itself and diminish its subsequent need to run by the expedient of
requiring adequate margin or collateral for the transaction, for in-
stance.135 As discussed below, the percentage of adequately collateralized
swaps should rise sharply when the clearinghouse requirements of the
new reform legislation are fully implemented.136 Moreover, for swaps
counterparties that are not adequately collateralized, the special treat-
ment may prevent one kind of run—mass exit from contracts before
bankruptcy—but increases the risk of other kinds of runs. If large num-
bers of counterparties demand collateral at the same time, for instance, a
debtor’s liquidity may quickly dry up, as AIG found when Goldman and
other banks ratcheted up their collateral demands. If the debtor did in
fact file for bankruptcy, the filing could trigger massive, simultaneous
cancellations of contracts and fire sales of the collateral securing the
contracts.137
While the case for the current, blunderbuss elimination of the stay
and other core bankruptcy policies is thus unpersuasive, the distinctive
characteristics of swaps and other financial contracts do justify a more
truncated automatic stay. The new reform legislation includes a one-plus
day halt on termination (which will function similarly to a stay in this
context) in resolution proceedings.138 We believe that a similarly trun-
cated stay—we would propose three business days—should be workable
in bankruptcy even in complex cases.139 Although some might argue that
134. See supra notes 68–69, 116 and accompanying text. R
135. Although this would be difficult if there were a long stay, because a
counterparty’s collateral would need to cover potentially large post-bankruptcy shifts in the
values of the contracts, it is less problematic if the stay is short.
136. See infra Part III.A.
137. See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, Bailouts, supra note 68, at 494–95 (discussing potential R
consequences of bankruptcy filing).
138. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 210(c)(10)(B)(i)(I), 124 Stat. 1376, 1491 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5390).
139. A proposal drafted by one of us (Jackson) for a working group coordinated by
the Hoover Institution calls for a similar three-day stay. See Jackson et al., Chapter 14
Proposal, supra note 107, at 2–27. In addition to its temporary restriction on ipso facto R
clauses, the Dodd-Frank Act also invalidates “walkaway” clauses that permit a counterparty
to cancel a contract without making any payment to the debtor, even if the debtor is in the
money. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(c)(8)(F), 124 Stat. at 1488 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5390). Walkaway clauses should also be invalidated in bankruptcy.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-1\COL104.txt unknown Seq: 34  3-JAN-12 7:45
2012] TRANSACTION CONSISTENCY 185
three days is not enough time, it is important to recognize that the man-
agers of a troubled financial institution will not begin thinking about
which swaps to assume and which to reject for the first time the day they
file for bankruptcy. Knowing that they only have three days to work with,
a debtor’s managers will have an incentive to plot their executory con-
tract decisions long before they actually file. Moreover, the Dodd-Frank
Act’s requirement that systemically important financial institutions pre-
pare wind-down plans on a regular basis, even while they are healthy, will
aid in the ability to sort out quickly which swaps to assume, as will the
increased transparency the new regulation should bring to the derivatives
markets.140
To summarize, the treatment of swaps under ordinary bankruptcy
principles would prove more complex than with repos. Swaps fall into all
three categories of bankruptcy contracts, and only the first—swaps that
function as loans—would be automatically terminated and accelerated.
Counterparties to other swaps would be subject to the automatic stay. The
value of their collateral would, however, be protected, and they would be
compensated for the value of the insurance provided while the stay was in
place.
D. Setoffs, Recoupment, and Netting
Thus far, we have treated derivatives and repos as isolated contracts
that the debtor is entitled to assume or reject on a contract-by-contract
basis. While contracts between a dealer bank and an end user—a business
that that uses derivatives for hedging—often take this form, the dealer
banks that dominate the derivatives market have numerous transactions
with one another.141 These contracts are generally coordinated under a
master agreement based on the standardized International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA) master agreement.142 Under current prac-
tice, which ISDA has successfully persuaded the U.S. and many other na-
tions to enshrine in law, the parties are authorized to close out and net all
140. See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d), 124 Stat. at 1426–27 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5365) (requiring wind-down plans). As explored below, Dodd-Frank also pushes towards
a regime in which most swaps would be traded on an exchange or “swap execution facility”
and cleared on a clearinghouse. See infra notes 168–180 and accompanying text. Such a R
move would almost certainly permit rapid valuations of swaps, again facilitating the ability
to make decisions regarding such swaps within a three-day stay period.
141. See, e.g., Duffie, Failure Mechanics, supra note 53, at 57–58 (noting that both R
parties to over-the-counter derivatives are frequently dealers).
142. ISDA is the principal trade and lobbying group for the derivatives industry. See
ISDA, http://www.isda.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2011). It supplies the standard form
contracts that are used (as customized by the parties) in most derivatives transactions. For
an example of a master agreement, see ISDA Master Agreement and Schedule Between
Comerica Bank and Rackspace US, Inc. dated Sept. 26, 2007, Exhibit 10.32, in Rackspace,
Inc. Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Apr. 25, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1107694/000119312508091225/dex1032.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
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of the contracts, not just an individual contract, in the event of a
default.143
The derivatives industry has touted netting as a signal benefit of ex-
isting practice, dramatically reducing exposure and as a result increasing
the potential scope of derivatives trading.144 Although netting did not
figure prominently in the early arguments for special treatment, the in-
dustry has increasingly pointed to netting as a reason why the current
bankruptcy exclusions need to be protected. The loss of netting rights in
the event derivatives were subject to a stay in bankruptcy and the debtor’s
ability to “cherry pick” among its contracts, the reasoning goes, would
radically increase the riskiness of derivatives and force a constriction of
the size of the derivatives markets.145
Once again, it is important to understand precisely how transaction
consistency would and would not affect the treatment of derivatives.
Before turning to this analysis, we note in passing that one could question
whether continued expansion of the derivatives market, which the indus-
try treats as irrefutably desirable, is necessarily a good thing. In the after-
math of the crisis, evidence has mounted that the financial sector may
have grown to too great a portion of the economy during the period of
derivatives expansion.146 Like the advocates of preserving special status
for derivatives, however, we agree that a return to transaction consistency
would be problematic if it destroyed all of the benefits of netting.
143. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B) (2006) (defining “swap agreement” to include a
master agreement); id. § 560 (exempting netting under swap agreement); id. § 561
(exempting netting across multiple swap and other financial market contracts and master
agreements).
144. Netting is the practice of offsetting cross-cutting obligations. If counterparty owes
debtor $50 on one derivative, for instance, while debtor owes counterparty $30 on another
derivative, counterparty’s “net” obligation to debtor is $20. If netting is not permitted, on
the other hand, the parties’ combined exposure would be $80. Netting can be seen as
significantly reducing overall exposure, and as a result overall risk, in the derivatives
markets. ISDA has warned that removing the special provisions protecting netting rights in
bankruptcy could have dire effects. See David Mengle, The Importance of Close-Out
Netting 6–7 (ISDA Research Notes No. 1, 2010), available at http://www2.isda.org/
attachment/MTY4MQ==/Netting-ISDAResearchNotes-1-2010.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (arguing unenforceability of netting will result in increased credit
exposure, shortfalls of collateral and capital, increased risk and uncertainty, and inability
to hedge). For a more equivocal assessment of the impact of netting, see Robert R. Bliss &
George G. Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout, 2 J.
Fin. Stability 55, 56 (2006) (“[I]t is not clear whether the netting and collateral provisions
when combined with closeout . . . decreases the potential for economic damage, as is
generally claimed in previous work, or indeed increases the risk.”).
145. See Mengle, supra note 144, at 3–4 (describing how netting avoids “unwanted R
exposure to . . . market risk” and noting “trillions of dollars of derivative notional amounts
outstanding are largely the result” of netting).
146. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton, Tano Santos & Jose A. Scheinkman, Is the Financial
Sector Too Big? 1–2 (Sept. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (modeling factors that can produce excessive development of financial
sector).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-1\COL104.txt unknown Seq: 36  3-JAN-12 7:45
2012] TRANSACTION CONSISTENCY 187
In reality, it would not. The key bankruptcy doctrines here are credi-
tors’ rights of setoff and recoupment. Under bankruptcy’s setoff provi-
sion, a creditor is entitled to offset mutual obligations that it and the
debtor owe to one another.147 Because many, and perhaps all, of the obli-
gations under a master agreement would be treated as mutual obliga-
tions, the debtor would not be able to pick and choose which derivatives
to assume. The debtor would be required to either assume or reject all of
the derivatives in a single master agreement.148 The cherry picking fear is
thus misguided as it relates to a single master agreement.
The principal difference between the current treatment of the con-
tracts in a master agreement, on the one hand, and transaction consis-
tency, on the other, is that a creditor cannot invoke ordinary setoff rights
unilaterally, and the creditor would be subject to the debtor’s ability to
assume all of the contracts if the debtor wishes to keep them in place.
Setoff is subject to the automatic stay, and is not permitted until the bank-
ruptcy judge authorizes it.149 Under our proposed treatment of deriva-
tives, this means that the counterparty’s ability to set off the contracts in
its master agreement would be delayed for up to three days. In our view,
this is a sensible compromise between immediate setoff—or netting, in
industry terminology—and the interest in facilitating an effective
restructuring.
In some contexts, another key doctrine—recoupment—would en-
able derivatives counterparties to avoid even this limited delay. Recoup-
ment is similar to a setoff, but a nondebtor with recoupment rights can
exercise the rights immediately, without interference from the automatic
stay.150 The key to recoupment is that it is available only when the
nondebtor and debtor have claims against one another that arise out of
the same transaction. In the classic recoupment case, the nondebtor with-
holds excess payments that the debtor has previously made under a sup-
ply contract, and uses them to offset the debtor’s next batch of obliga-
147. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(a).
148. The Dodd-Frank Act’s resolution regime takes this principle still further,
requiring that the FDIC either assume or reject all of its derivatives with a single
counterparty, regardless of whether they are part of a single master agreement. Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210(c)(9),
124 Stat. 1376, 1489–90 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
149. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (providing that stay applies to setoffs of any debt owing to
debtor that arose before commencement of case against any claim against debtor).
150. Recoupment is treated as an “equitable exception” to the automatic stay. See,
e.g., Thompson v. Bd. of Trs. of the Fairfax Cnty. Police Officers Ret. Sys. (In re
Thompson), 182 B.R. 140, 146 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (explaining rationale and scope of
automatic stay doctrine).
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tions under the contract.151 Because the claims are so closely connected,
the nondebtor is entitled to exercise recoupment rights.152
Any derivative or repo in which the parties owe cross-cutting obliga-
tions to one another would be a candidate for recoupment. If the debtor
had made margin payments to the nondebtor under a swap, for instance,
and values shifted so that the nondebtor had liability under the swap,
recoupment would enable the nondebtor to use the excess margin to off-
set its obligations to the debtor.153
If a master agreement is treated as a single contract, recoupment
could even apply to all of the obligations in the agreement. Although one
line of cases has defined the mutuality requirement quite restrictively, the
transactions in a single master agreement will often be so closely related
that they should, in our view, be subject to recoupment rights.154 This
would not give the nondebtor the right to immediately terminate all of
the derivatives in a master agreement. However, the nondebtor could use
its recoupment rights to offset any claims pressed by the debtor (such as
requests for margin payments) during the period before the debtor made
its decision whether to assume or reject.
In our view, the existing bankruptcy rules described above need only
be adjusted in one significant way. Under the analysis presented thus far,
a master agreement that included both derivatives and repos, as many do,
would automatically be terminated, because repos could not be assumed.
In theory, the parties could solve this problem by separating their deriva-
tives contracts from their repos. But the leading dealers might continue
to mix the treatment, either because they do not anticipate bankruptcy or
in a deliberate effort to limit the benefits of bankruptcy. To prevent the
artificial termination of all of the contracts in a master agreement due to
the presence of a repo, we recommend that lawmakers amend the execu-
tory contract provision to make clear that termination or acceleration of
151. In Ashland Petroleum Co. v. Appel (In re B&L Oil Co.), 782 F.2d 155 (10th Cir.
1986), a leading recoupment case, B&L Oil executed an oil division order in favor of
Ashland Petroleum which granted Ashland the right to purchase oil from B&L. On two
occasions Ashland overpaid B&L for the oil. Id. at 156. B&L subsequently filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy. Id. After filing, Ashland withheld money from payments owed to B&L for
subsequent oil deliveries in order to recoup Ashland’s pre-petition overpayments. Id. The
Tenth Circuit found that recoupment did apply in this instance because the order was a
single contract and the overpayments were analogous to advances and overpayments in
other cases where application of the doctrine was upheld. Id. at 158–59.
152. Id. at 157 (noting availability of recoupment when debtor and creditor’s claims
arise from same transaction).
153. For an argument that the nondebtor should have a right of setoff under similar
circumstances, see Johnson, supra note 121, at 986 (“[P]ermitting a pledgor to setoff its R
payment obligation against posted collateral would appear to limit the systemic risk that
concerned Congress in the event of the bankruptcy of the secured party.”).
154. See, e.g., Tavenner v. United States (In re Vance), 298 B.R. 262, 267–68 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2003) (describing comparatively capacious “logical relationship” test, and
contrasting more restrictive approach requiring that obligations must arise out of “single
integrated transaction”).
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a repo does not preclude assumption by the debtor of other, related
contracts.155
Overall, then, concerns about the effect of transaction consistency
are significantly overstated. With the limited exceptions we have noted,
existing bankruptcy rules accommodate the concerns that transaction
consistency would undermine the benefits of netting that are available
under existing law.
E. Preference and Fraudulent Conveyance
In addition to insulation from the automatic stay, the other major
protection for derivatives and repos in bankruptcy is that they are ex-
cluded from bankruptcy’s preference and fraudulent conveyance provi-
sions. With ordinary creditors, if an insolvent debtor makes payments or
transfers collateral within ninety days of bankruptcy, the transfer can be
avoided (and the creditor required to give the value back) as a prefer-
ence.156 Similarly, if an insolvent debtor enters into a transaction for
which it does not receive reasonably equivalent value, the transaction can
be reversed as a fraudulent conveyance.157 These rules are waived off for
repos, derivatives, and other financial contracts.158
Once again, the industry concerns that are used to justify this exclu-
sion are not nearly so serious as is generally assumed.159 Even the legiti-
155. One final adjustment: As noted earlier, we also would include language making
clear that “walkaway” clauses are not enforceable in bankruptcy, just as they are invalidated
in the new Dodd-Frank resolution regime. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210(c)(8)(F), 124 Stat. 1376, 1488, (2010) (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
156. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006).
157. Id. § 548(a)(1)(B).
158. Id. § 546(e)–(g).
159. ISDA justifies this exception from preference law as follows:
This provision enables market participants to continue to trade with weakening
parties immediately prior to any bankruptcy filing (subject to prohibitions against
intentionally fraudulent transactions), so as to allow those weakening parties
continued access to market accommodations that might help them survive.
Without these safe harbor protections, market participants would be extremely
reluctant to enter transactions with a weakening party in order to avoid receiving
payments or taking collateral within the Code’s suspect time periods relating to
preferences and fraudulent conveyances.
Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, Bankruptcy Code Swap Safe Harbor Overview 3 (2010) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). This argument, note, does not apply to new transactions
with “weakening parties” within the preference period (as such new transactions would be
for new value). Rather, the argument suggests that, prior to the preference period, such
contracts will not be entered into as frequently because of the preference risk. Putting
aside that this does not distinguish these transactions from any other transactions (all of
which are subject to preference risk), the argument ultimately depends on the assumption
that “continued access to market accommodations” of “weakening parties” is a good thing.
We believe a strong counterargument—that weakening parties should be resolved and
financial players with the greatest expertise and monitoring ability are in the best position
to stop inevitable delay—is as or more plausible. In any event, the ISDA argument runs
counter to the overarching policy of preference law.
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mate worry of derivatives participants about the ongoing adjustments
they make to the margin or collateral put up in connection with the con-
tract being caught in a preference snare does not justify the current re-
gime of wholesale exclusion of derivatives from preference law. With the
swap described earlier, for instance, in which Bank of America promised
to pay $1.3 million in return for C= 1 million from Goldman Sachs in six
months, the parties ordinarily would adjust their margin on a daily ba-
sis.160 If the value of the dollar increased, Bank of America would aug-
ment its margin, as would Goldman if the euro went up. If preference law
applied and Bank of America filed for bankruptcy, each of the margin
payments made or additional collateral posted by Bank of America dur-
ing the ninety days before bankruptcy might be challenged as preferen-
tial. Not only would sorting out the sequence of transfers be mind-
numbingly difficult, advocates of special treatment argue, but the pay-
ments really are not preferential at all. They are simply ordinary adjust-
ments, rather than special treatment.
If one focuses on these ordinary adjustments and sets to one side
predefault grabs like Goldman’s demands for collateral as AIG wobbled,
this argument is compelling. But the plight of derivatives counterparties
is not unique. Other credit arrangements have raised very similar issues
in the past and have been addressed in bankruptcy’s preference provi-
sions. Most closely analogous is the treatment of lenders who take security
interests in inventory or the debtor’s accounts receivable. Because inven-
tory is sold and debtors collect accounts receivable, the lender’s original
collateral disappears, and its security interest attaches to the new inven-
tory the debtor acquires to replenish its stock and to the debtor’s new
accounts.161 Prior to the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, attach-
ment of the debtor’s security interest to the new collateral during the
ninety days before bankruptcy could be challenged as preferential, even
though it simply replaces the original collateral, because it is a transfer of
a property interest to the creditor on the eve of bankruptcy.162
Congress addressed this problem by including a special protection
for inventory and receivable lenders in the preference provision.163
Under this provision, commonly known as the “two-point net improve-
ment” provision, collateral transfers can only be avoided to the extent
they make the lender better off as of bankruptcy than the lender was
ninety days before bankruptcy. If the lender is fully collateralized ninety
days before bankruptcy, nothing can be avoided. If the lender is less un-
160. See supra text accompanying note 134 (outlining Bank of America and Goldman R
swap hypotheticals).
161. This assumes that the lender has an “after acquired” property clause in its
security agreement, as inventory and receivable lenders invariably do. See U.C.C. § 9-204
(2011) (authorizing after acquired property clauses).
162. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2006)). The change
was explained in Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 209–10 (1973).
163. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5).
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dercollateralized at bankruptcy than it was at ninety days before bank-
ruptcy, the difference—the amount by which the lender’s position has
improved—can be avoided but only that amount.
The same principle should be extended to derivatives and repos. So
long as the counterparty’s position is not improved during the ninety
days before bankruptcy, the trustee would not be permitted to avoid any
of the margin and collateral adjustments as preferential. If the
counterparty has strengthened its protections on the eve of bankruptcy,
on the other hand, it would be required to give back the amount of the
improvement. While the parties often will have made numerous adjust-
ments during the ninety-day period, this approach only requires two cal-
culations—one for the beginning of the ninety-day period and one as of
bankruptcy. Given that the parties calculate values continuously, deter-
mining whether there has been an improvement in position should be
quite straightforward.164
The approach we propose would require an amendment to the pref-
erence provision, and we strongly advocate this amendment. But even in
the absence of a formal amendment, courts might be able to achieve a
similar result by applying the existing preference provision. If the parties’
mutual adjustments were construed as substitutions of collateral, they
might be protected, much as courts protected inventory and receivable
lenders before the enactment of the current two-point net improvement
test.165
In addition to collateral and margin adjustments, the other major
prebankruptcy maneuvers that could run aground of the preference pro-
vision are transactions that are designed to enable a counterparty to close
out its relationship with the debtor. Recall from our earlier hypothetical
that Goldman Sachs could exit its relationship with Bank of America by
proposing to offset their earlier transaction with a new swap, under which
it promised to pay Bank of America $1.3 million dollars in return for
C= 1 million. Should this transaction be treated as preferential? If
Goldman owes Bank of America under the earlier swap, we believe the
offsetting swap does indeed give Goldman an inappropriate benefit at the
164. This stands in notable contrast to the current § 547(c)(5), which can be difficult
to apply because of the need to determine the value of the inventory or receivable
collateral as of ninety days before bankruptcy, something inherently difficult when it
consists of a non-liquid cluster of, say, inventory.
165. The best known case prior to the adoption of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) in 1976 was
Grain Merchants of Ind., Inc. v. Union Bank & Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1969).
In Grain Merchants, the court held that the lender had not received preferences when its
security interest attached to new inventory and accounts receivable during the preference
period, despite the apparent violation, because the new security interest was a replacement
for the lender’s interest in prior inventory and accounts. Id. at 218. Under the current
§ 547, courts might treat the adjustments as contemporaneous exchanges of new value,
which are protected by § 547(c)(1). The fit is not perfect, however, because the parties are
not substituting new for old collateral, as inventory and receivable lenders do. Rather, they
are adding or subtracting collateral as the values under the contract change.
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expense of Bank of America’s other creditors, since the transaction
reduces Goldman’s (otherwise unsecured) exposure on the eve of bank-
ruptcy.166 In form, Goldman has not received a standard preference, be-
cause the new swap is not simply a payment or other transfer to Goldman.
Instead, Goldman has created a setoff, which effectively ensures that its
unsecured obligation will be paid in full. This, too, is anticipated by the
bankruptcy laws. Under existing law, the creation of a setoff can be
avoided to the extent it leaves the debtor’s counterparty better off.167
This logic, which seems altogether appropriate, would only apply if
Goldman exited the relationship through an offsetting swap with Bank of
America, rather than with a different counterparty.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
Although the Dodd-Frank Act borrows a number of bankruptcy pro-
visions, it nonetheless leaves bankruptcy’s statutory provisions oddly un-
touched. But while there are no direct statutory changes to bankruptcy
law, there are important ways in which the Dodd-Frank Act affects bank-
ruptcy indirectly. If it functions as intended, the legislation will require
that most derivatives be traded on an exchange and be subject to clearing
on a recognized clearinghouse. The likelihood that a larger percentage
of derivatives will be cleared and exchange-traded enhances the case for
transaction consistency with derivatives in bankruptcy. In addition, the
new resolution regime for large financial institutions, another major
Dodd-Frank innovation, creates a conflict between bankruptcy and reso-
lution treatment of derivatives, sharply increasing the stakes of the deci-
sion whether to restore transaction consistency.
A. The New Clearinghouse and Exchange Requirements
The Dodd-Frank Act gives the CFTC and SEC the authority to re-
quire that every swap be cleared on a clearinghouse unless no clearing
organization will accept the swap.168 Swaps that are cleared must also be
traded on an exchange or “swap execution facility,” rather than negoti-
ated privately between the two parties.169 The new requirements dramati-
cally increase the regulatory oversight of derivatives outside of bank-
166. If Goldman owes Bank of America, on the other hand, the new swap is not
preferential because it simply has the effect of prepaying an obligation that Goldman
would otherwise be required to pay later.
167. If a nondebtor incurs an obligation in order to create a right to set off the
obligation against an unsecured claim, and affects the setoff prior to bankruptcy, the
trustee is authorized to retrieve the amount by which the nondebtor’s position is
improved. 11 U.S.C. § 553(b) (allowing trustee to recover reduction in insufficiency on
date of setoff compared to amount of insufficiency ninety days before filing of petition in
bankruptcy). If the nondebtor does not invoke its setoff right until after the bankruptcy is
filed, 11 U.S.C. § 553(a)(3) achieves the same effect.
168. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 723(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–76, 1681 (2010) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2).
169. Id.
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ruptcy, and they have other important indirect implications for
bankruptcy.
With swaps that are cleared, the clearinghouse interposes itself be-
tween the two counterparties to a swap and stands ready to make good on
either side of the contract if one of the counterparties fails.170 Because
the clearinghouse is responsible for both sides’ performance, it will re-
quire each to post margin or collateral on an ongoing basis and will mon-
itor both sides. If Bank of America and Goldman enter into a swap requir-
ing Bank of America to deliver $1.3 million and Goldman to deliver
C= 1 million, the clearinghouse would serve as guarantor of each side’s
performance and would require each to meet specified margin
requirements.
Closely linked with the clearinghouse innovation is a requirement
that swaps be traded on exchanges (or executed on swap execution facili-
ties),171 rather than negotiated privately in the over-the-counter (OTC)
market, unless no exchange will have them. The objective here is trans-
parency: Swaps will need to be standardized if they are traded on ex-
changes like stocks or bonds, which will make them easier to price and
compare.
The initial question posed by this restructuring of the derivatives
market is whether it moots the argument for transaction consistency. If
Bank of America and Goldman are both fully protected by the presence
of a clearinghouse, some might say, there is not much need for an auto-
matic stay. But this misunderstands the intent of the automatic stay. If
Bank of America were to file for bankruptcy, the presence of a clearing-
house would protect Goldman and thus diminish the risk that Goldman
would be destabilized by Bank of America’s default. But an important
goal of the stay is to enable Bank of America to arrange an efficient dispo-
sition of its assets in bankruptcy. This may depend on, among other
things, preserving existing hedging arrangements.172 The clearinghouse
arrangement has no effect on this function (other than to introduce the
issue, discussed below, of whether the clearinghouse also should be sub-
ject to the stay), and does not eliminate its importance.173
170. The guaranty is somewhat qualified. The clearinghouse has the option of paying
the defaulting party’s obligation or obtaining a substitute contract. If the clearinghouse
decides to pay, it determines the appropriate value. We are grateful to Kimberly Summe
for pointing this out to us.
171. Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a), 124 Stat. at 1681 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2).
172. Bank of America could try to replace any hedging transaction that a
counterparty terminated, of course, but the costs could be substantial.
173. Under Dodd-Frank’s resolution rules, clearinghouses are subject to the standstill,
Dodd-Frank Act § 210(c)(10)(B), 124 Stat. at 1491 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390), but
they are permitted to continue enforcing margin obligations. Id. § 210(c)(8)(G), 124 Stat.
at 1489 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390). This protection will not have much practical
effect because the FDIC will invariably protect all of the institution’s derivatives contracts.
As noted below, the clearinghouse should not be insulated from the effect of the stay in
bankruptcy.
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The bottom line for exchange trading is the same. A swap that is
exchange traded is more fungible than an OTC swap, which might seem
to suggest that it need not be stayed. But exchange-traded swaps are not
like cash. The swap may be an important component of a debtor’s portfo-
lio of hedges or brokerage operations. Even if it would be simpler to re-
place than an OTC swap, its immediate termination could undermine a
debtor’s disposition of its assets.
Any case for exempting cleared, exchange-traded swaps from trans-
action consistency would therefore need to rest on other grounds. The
best, though ultimately unpersuasive, argument for exemption is tied to
the distinction between cleared- and exchange-traded and noncleared-
and nonexchange-traded swaps under the new legislation. Exempting
cleared derivatives, but not noncleared derivatives, would create an in-
centive for counterparties to favor cleared derivatives.174 While we too
favor efforts to direct swaps toward clearinghouses and exchanges, this
objective is not sufficient to justify jettisoning transaction consistency.
The stay is essential to reduce the credit subsidy for derivatives and to
facilitate the efficient disposition of the assets of the debtor—Bank of
America in the hypothetical.
The status of the clearinghouse itself is more delicate. If the clearing-
house were solely a middleman, it would be a simple matter to conclude
that the stay and other core bankruptcy policies should not apply. But the
clearinghouse is far more than a conduit. It is not like the stockbrokers
whose settlement and margin payments were protected by the original
1978 exemptions.175 As guarantor of both sides’ performance (indeed,
technically a counterparty to each), and as the principal monitor, the
clearinghouse is itself an integral player.
Because the clearinghouse is not simply a middleman, the presump-
tion of transaction consistency should apply unless there are other rea-
sons that would justify protection from the stay and other bankruptcy pol-
icies. The most compelling argument would stem from the new centrality
of the clearinghouses to the stability of American finance. Prior to the
new legislation, large, interconnected institutions like Citigroup or AIG
were the major sources of systemic risk. With the new legislation, that risk
may be shifted to the clearinghouses. They are the new too-big-to-fail enti-
ties, given their obligation to guarantee all cleared derivatives con-
tracts.176 The financial system cannot afford, some might argue, for clear-
174. The rationale is that cleared derivatives would enjoy slightly superior treatment,
because they would not be subject to the automatic stay in the event one of the
counterparties later filed for bankruptcy. At the margin, this would encourage parties to
use cleared rather than noncleared derivatives.
175. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (describing arguments that R
brokers were simply conduits and should not be subject to preference and fraudulent
conveyance rules).
176. This point is made (sarcastically) in Editorial, Another Dodd-Frank Triumph,
Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 2011, at A16 (criticizing clearinghouse provisions of Dodd-Frank Act as
creating new sources of systemic risk).
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inghouses to be hampered in any way by bankruptcy provisions like the
stay and the trustee’s avoidance powers.
While we appreciate these concerns, we do not believe that they add
up to a rationale for jettisoning transaction consistency. The first thing to
note is that the clearinghouse could protect itself by requiring that swaps
be adequately collateralized.177 Moreover, the interference proposed in
this Essay is quite limited—a three-day stay and a preference reachback
cabined by the two-point net improvement safe harbor.178 The bite of
transaction consistency would thus be very much at the margins, affecting
undercollateralized swaps for a brief transition period.
The core difficulty with retaining the more sweeping current exemp-
tions stems from the fact that the clearinghouses will be stepping into the
shoes of the major derivatives trading banks. The clearinghouse, rather
than the counterparty, will now be a debtor’s principal monitor and cred-
itor. The special treatment would, at the margins, diminish the clearing-
house’s incentive to monitor the counterparties, and would diminish the
debtor’s ability to maximize the value of its assets.179 In short, leaving the
exemptions in place for clearinghouses would thus replicate some of the
distortions that exacerbated the 2008 crisis.
One last issue deserves comment. What if the clearinghouse itself
were to fail? Once again, the stay should apply, although the reasoning
differs in some respects. If the debtor is a clearinghouse, considerations
such as preserving a viable business (or viable components of a business)
loom less large than with other firms. The key concern is limiting the
disruption to the derivatives cleared on the exchange.
The importance of a stay may vary depending on how many clearing-
houses emerge as a result of Dodd-Frank, and whether the clearinghouse
177. Adequate collateralization would consist of collateral in the amount of the
shortfall from the counterparty that is currently out of the money, plus sufficient collateral
to cover possible swings in value during the three-day period of the stay.
178. Somewhat ironically, exempting clearinghouses from the three-day automatic
stay would undermine one of the key advantages clearinghouses (and exchanges) provide.
The ability to make three-day decisions regarding the assumption or rejection of swaps
requires accurate valuation information that is virtually instantaneously available. Swaps
cleared on clearinghouses (and therefore traded on exchanges or swap-execution
facilities) would have precisely this attribute. If, however, clearinghouses were exempted
from the automatic stay, the swaps that would remain subject to the three-day stay
proposed here would likely be the ones without accurate and instantaneous pricing
information. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (introducing proposed three- R
business-day truncated stay).
179. While the attention has been on whether clearinghouses should be exempted
from bankruptcy’s automatic stay, the same reasoning would apply if the issue were
whether clearinghouses should be exempted from bankruptcy’s preference rules (as
adjusted pursuant to the analysis). Although incomplete, preference rules are bankruptcy
law’s most important effort to address a serious problem that leads bankruptcies to
systematically start too late: These rules deny gains from creditors who foresee bankruptcy
but avoid, rather than commencing, it. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text R
(introducing concept of preference rules). For that reason, the monitoring argument for
counterparties applies equally to their inclusion in the preference rules for swaps.
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that falls into distress has a large presence in the market. If a small
clearinghouse failed, the derivatives could be moved to other clearing-
houses, perhaps even in the absence of a stay. If a clearinghouse of any
substantial size failed, by contrast, a stay would be essential in order to
provide enough time to determine which derivatives to assume and which
to reject.180 The managers of a clearinghouse could not effectively han-
dle large numbers of derivatives quickly enough to prevent systemic dam-
age in the absence of the stay. The market for clearinghouses is currently
quite concentrated, and seems likely to remain concentrated. Moreover,
a stay might be beneficial even for a small clearinghouse if its failure
comes, as often will be the case, when many counterparties are them-
selves stressed. It is therefore important that the stay apply to clearing-
house failures, as it does in other contexts.
B. Resolution Authority
The new framework for large, systemically important financial insti-
tutions gives bank regulators the power to take over troubled-bank hold-
ing companies, systemically important nonbank financial institutions, or
other companies that are predominantly engaged in financial activi-
ties.181 Although the trigger is more complex—calling for U.S. Treasury
initiation with the concurrence of the Federal Reserve and FDIC182—the
new authority is designed to give the FDIC the same kinds of resolution
powers it has with ordinary commercial banks.183 The FDIC has a nearly
unfettered right to sell or transfer assets or liabilities to third parties, as
with ordinary banks.184 With repos and derivatives, the FDIC is given a
one-plus-day period during which counterparties cannot terminate or net
180. For an argument that Dodd-Frank’s one-day standstill would not be enough time
to handle the huge number of derivatives for which a clearinghouse is responsible, see
Julia Lees Allen, Note, Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy and
Dodd-Frank Analysis, 64 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012).
181. The resolution rules are set forth in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, entitled
Orderly Resolution Authority (OLA). See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. II, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442 (2010) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5381). Interestingly, there is no requirement that a financial institution be
designated as systemically important under section 805 (a category that subjects it to
extensive new regulation under Title I) prior to being taken over under the resolution
rules. Id. § 805, 124 Stat. at 1809 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464). Instead, regulators
need only find that it is a “covered financial company” because, among other things, its
failure might cause systemic damage. Id. § 202, 124 Stat. at 1444–50 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5382) (outlining requirements for resolution petition).
182. Id. § 203(a), 124 Stat. at 1450–51 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1583(a))
(requiring recommendation by U.S. Treasury and approval by two-thirds of Federal
Reserve Governors and FDIC Board).
183. The analogy between FDIC resolution and the Dodd-Frank resolution rules is
criticized at length in Skeel, New Financial Deal, supra note 48, at 117–27 (arguing R
rationale for FDIC resolution of small- and medium-sized banks does not apply to large
financial institutions).
184. Id. at 123–24.
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their contracts.185 During this time, the FDIC is permitted to decide
which contracts to transfer, subject to the stricture that the FDIC must
transfer either all or none of the contracts with any given counterparty.
The relationship between the resolution framework and our transac-
tion consistency analysis is initially counterintuitive. If one concluded that
the stay is most essential for large, systemically important debtors—as is
plausible186—the resolution framework might appear to make a bank-
ruptcy stay unnecessary. The kinds of institutions that featured in the cri-
sis—the AIGs and Lehmans—are covered by the FDIC’s newly expanded
powers, and these powers include a temporary stay. To the extent that the
key institutions are taken care of, parallel reform of the bankruptcy laws
may not seem so urgent.
In our view, transaction consistency should not be limited to large,
systemically important financial institutions. Even if one wished to limit
its scope to these institutions, the new resolution regime would not obvi-
ate the need for bankruptcy changes. The scope of the regime, broad as it
is, is not exhaustive. Most financial institutions, even quite large ones,
would be subject to the bankruptcy process, not the new resolution re-
gime.187 More importantly, even those institutions that clearly are cov-
ered—Bank of America, for instance—are not precluded from filing for
bankruptcy. Only if the U.S. Treasury initiates the new regime prior to a
bankruptcy filing, or removes the institution from bankruptcy after it has
filed, will the new regime be employed with even the largest
institutions.188
Indeed, the asymmetry between the Dodd-Frank and bankruptcy
treatment of repos and derivatives—with a one-plus-day prohibition on
termination in Dodd-Frank resolution but no stay in bankruptcy—makes
185. Under the new resolution rules, qualified financial contracts (which include
repos and derivatives) cannot be terminated until 5 PM of the day after a receiver is
appointed. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(c)(10)(B), 124 Stat. at 1491 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5390).
186. See, e.g., Skeel, Bankruptcy, supra note 63, at 19 (explaining possible benefits of R
stay only for systemically important institutions).
187. Assistant Treasury Secretary Michael Barr, the Obama Administration’s point
person for the legislation, assured lawmakers that “bankruptcy proceedings will remain the
dominant option for handing the failure of a non-bank financial institution, even very
large ones.” Too Big to Fail: The Role for Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law in Financial
Regulatory Reform (Part I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 23 (2009) (prepared statement of Michael
S. Barr, Assistant Treasury Secretary); see also U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Financial
Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation 76–79 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.
gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“Bankruptcy is and will remain the dominant tool for handling the failure of a [bank
holding company], unless the special resolution regime is triggered because of concerns
about financial stability.”).
188. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 208, 124 Stat. 1376, 1459–60 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1588)
(authorizing removal of case from bankruptcy to Dodd-Frank resolution).
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the need for a stay even greater. If a troubled, systemically important fi-
nancial institution filed for bankruptcy, its counterparties would be well
aware that they would lose their right to terminate if bank regulators were
to transfer the case from bankruptcy to resolution. As a result,
counterparties would have an even stronger incentive to terminate their
contracts immediately than they did prior to the enactment of the new
resolution rules. Reintroducing a limited stay in bankruptcy would re-
move these perverse incentives.
Even the most avid proponents of the regime have characterized its
use as a last resort, with bankruptcy preferable except in extreme cases.189
From this perspective, the resolution regime makes bankruptcy reform
more urgent, rather than less. Under the present framework, with the
resolution framework superimposed on the bankruptcy laws, there is little
incentive for a large troubled financial institution to file for bankruptcy.
In the absence of a stay, derivatives counterparties’ ability to cancel their
contracts en masse would severely complicate the managers’ efforts to
arrange an efficient resolution.190 With one of the most important bene-
fits of bankruptcy unavailable, the managers may stall, hoping for regula-
tory forbearance.191
If bankruptcy included a stay and other protections, by contrast,
managers would have an incentive to prepare for and file for bankruptcy
in the event of financial distress. From the managers’ perspective, the
prospect of a stay would be superior to resolution because it would give
them a meaningful prospect of achieving an effective resolution. The stay
would halt a run by the institution’s derivatives counterparties long
enough to facilitate a sale or other disposition of key assets. If AIG had
been able to access a bankruptcy stay, for instance, it could have resisted
the collateral calls that hastened its decline by filing for bankruptcy.192
Under the current regime, AIG had an irresistible incentive to do what it
did: plan for a bailout. The prospect that a stay might encourage the
managers of a large financial institution to plan for bankruptcy in ad-
vance and then use the bankruptcy option strongly reinforces the case for
189. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing statement of Assistant R
Treasury Secretary Michael Barr).
190. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text (discussing this dilemma with R
AIG).
191. Moreover, if any large troubled financial institution did start in bankruptcy, even
with the extraordinarily rapid (and potentially unconstitutional) ability of the government
to remove the institution from bankruptcy and place it within the orderly liquidation
authority of Title II of Dodd-Frank, Dodd-Frank Act § 202(a), 124 Stat. at 1444–46 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382), absent a brief stay on derivative counterparties in bankruptcy,
the stay provided in the orderly liquidation authority of Dodd-Frank may prove to be
illusory. See Skeel, New Financial Deal, supra note 48, at 139 (noting constitutional R
difficulties with process by which orderly liquidation authority is commenced for entity
already in bankruptcy).
192. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text (describing crisis at AIG). R
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transaction consistency with derivatives and other financial instruments
in bankruptcy.
IV. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR REFORM
Given the effects of bankruptcy’s departures from transaction consis-
tency during the recent crisis, we strongly favor a return to thoroughgo-
ing transaction consistency for repos and other financial instruments. But
we also recognize that compromises and incomplete solutions are an in-
evitable part of the political process. We therefore begin by summarizing
our ideal reforms, then introduce several more partial solutions.
Full transaction consistency would mean removing the existing ex-
emptions from core bankruptcy policy for repos, swaps, and other finan-
cial contracts, with several important wrinkles discussed earlier. The spe-
cial provisions exempting these contracts from bankruptcy’s anti-ipso
facto rules would be deleted, in order to implement bankruptcy’s stan-
dard limitation on ipso facto clauses.193 We would reintroduce the auto-
matic stay but limit its duration to three days, due to the volatility and
short timeline of derivatives contracts.194 Bankruptcy’s preference and
fraudulent conveyance rules also should be reintroduced for derivatives.
Because of their similarity to accounts and inventory financing, we would
protect collateral transfers that do not improve the counterparty’s overall
position, as bankruptcy does with accounts and inventory.195 We would
apply these adjustments to clearinghouses as well as ordinary
counterparties.196
The first alternative would entail simply imposing a three-day delay
on the exemptions for repos and derivatives from bankruptcy’s anti-ipso
facto provisions. This approach, which is the strategy lawmakers have em-
ployed for systemically important institutions under the Dodd-Frank Act’s
resolution rules,197 is the most minimalist reform that would nudge these
financial contracts toward transaction consistency and diminish the per-
193. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) (2006) (invalidating ipso facto clauses), with
id. § 559 (allowing ipso facto clauses in repos), and id. § 560 (allowing ipso facto clauses in
swaps).
194. See supra Part II.C (describing proposal for swaps and derivatives).
195. See supra Part II.E (proposing rules for preference and fraudulent conveyance).
196. See supra Part III.A (describing Dodd-Frank clearinghouse requirement). In this
ideal world, we would, of course, recommend that there be consistency between our
proposals for repos and derivatives in bankruptcy and those in Title II of Dodd-Frank,
preferably by having Title II of Dodd-Frank mirror the rules we would place in bankruptcy.
This idea—consistency between bankruptcy and Title II of Dodd-Frank in the application
of substantive rules—would likewise apply to our alternatives as well. We focus in text on
bankruptcy reforms, however, believing that issues concerning reopening Dodd-Frank for
amendment raise a whole different level of political issues.
197. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 210(c)(10)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1491 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390)
(preventing invocation of ipso facto clause until 5 PM the day after resolution petition is
filed).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-1\COL104.txt unknown Seq: 49  3-JAN-12 7:45
200 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:152
verse incentives created by their special treatment. This most simple of
reforms would prevent the kind of mass termination by counterparties
that an AIG bankruptcy would have triggered. By preventing immediate
exit by the debtor’s counterparties, bankruptcy’s anti-ipso facto provi-
sions would give the debtor a short window of opportunity to arrange a
sale or other disposition of its assets. Our principal concern with reintro-
ducing bankruptcy’s ipso facto provisions for three days, rather than pro-
viding a true stay, is the risk of circumvention. Derivatives professionals
could attempt to contract around the proscription by, for instance, intro-
ducing a contractual provision that authorizes a counterparty to seize and
sell collateral without formally terminating the contract.198 The anti-ipso
facto clause strategy would thus require vigilant judicial oversight, with
bankruptcy courts construing the anti-ipso facto provisions broadly
enough to foreclose circumventions.199
A second alternative to full transaction consistency would couple the
minimalist strategy of temporarily reinstating the anti-ipso facto rules
with an automatic stay that would cover only swap transactions.200 Be-
cause swaps are a large percentage of the overall derivatives market, im-
posing a stay on these derivatives but not on other financial contacts
would substantially increase transaction consistency. Repos, the other ma-
jor component of the new finance, would retain their special status in
bankruptcy. As this Essay has demonstrated, this status differs only in lim-
ited respects from the treatment repos would receive under true transac-
tion consistency.201 As financial accommodations, repos would be auto-
matically terminated when the debtor filed for bankruptcy. Imposing a
stay on repos is thus less crucial to restoring transaction consistency. A
stay on swaps, by contrast, would remove an important distortion in ex-
isting finance, limit the risk of mass terminations and collateral sales, and
facilitate an orderly disposition of assets.
Each of the alternatives to full transaction consistency could be
adopted either by itself or together with our proposed reforms to the
preference provision; the preference reforms are, in a sense, another dis-
tinct module. Lawmakers might choose to forgo the preference reform
initially, in order to focus first on the largest source of distortion and to
198. If a stay were in place, these steps would be prohibited. But they would not be
prevented if Congress reinstated bankruptcy’s anti-ipso facto provisions while leaving
counterparties’ exemption from the stay in place.
199. The bankruptcy judge’s handling of the Lehman case gives some comfort in this
regard. The judge ruled, for instance, that Lehman’s counterparties who did not promptly
exercise their right to terminate were deemed to have waived this right. Order to Compel
Performance of Contract and to Enforce the Automatic Stay at *1, In re Lehman Bros.
Holdings, No. 08-13555 (JMP), 2009 WL 6057286 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2009).
200. In addition to repealing 11 U.S.C. §§ 559, 560 and related provisions, this reform
would entail modifications to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(7) and 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17)
reintroducing a three-day stay.
201. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing characteristics making repos similar to secured
loans).
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avoid the potential complexity of assessing a debtor’s prebankruptcy
transactions.
We should reiterate that moving to full transaction consistency is
much preferable to any of the more partial alternatives, but each step in
this direction will remedy the distortions caused by the special treatment
that derivatives currently receive.
CONCLUSION
The new finance that has emerged in the past thirty years has often
seemed so innovative and different that it could not possibly be subject to
the rules that applied to old-fashioned lending arrangements. The mar-
ket appeared to be sui generis—both distinct and self-regulating.
This Essay has sought to show that the instruments of contemporary
finance are not quite so radically different as is conventionally thought.
Analysis through the lens of the concept we call transaction consistency
shows that derivatives and repos should not simply be insulated from core
bankruptcy rules such as the automatic stay and the prohibition of eve-of-
bankruptcy preferences. Subjecting derivatives and repos to transaction
consistency would have a less radical effect than is commonly thought,
and the effect would be beneficial overall. If it has persuaded a few read-
ers that derivatives and repos can be analyzed under the same framework
that applies to other contracts, this Essay will have been a success.202
We do not claim that a currency swap is no different than a tradi-
tional equipment loan, and that a credit default swap is simply an insur-
ance contract. Derivatives and repos do have distinctive qualities, such as
the volatility of their value. But these are differences of degree, not differ-
ences in kind. Under the framework proposed in this Essay, the stay
would be limited to three days, and repos secured by cash-like securities
would not be subject to the stay. These adjustments are arrived at by sim-
ply applying the concepts that underlie bankruptcy’s treatment of ordi-
nary contracts.
202. The issues are of far more than academic interest alone. The Dodd-Frank Act
calls for two different reports on the efficacy of bankruptcy for handling financial
institution failures. Dodd-Frank Act § 202(e), 124 Stat. at 1448–49 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5382) (providing for study by Administrative Office and Comptroller); id. § 216,
124 Stat. at 1519 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5394) (providing for study by Federal
Reserve and Administrative Office). The report by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System was issued in July 2011. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Study on
the Resolution of Financial Companies Under the Bankruptcy Code (2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/bankruptcy-financial-
study-201107.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (laying out various alternatives,
including ones close to those proposed by this Essay, without committing to any one
outcome). The treatment of repos and derivatives in bankruptcy will be central to the
analysis of these studies. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 216(a)(2)(D), 124 Stat. at 1519 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5394) (calling for analysis of whether special treatment of qualified
financial contracts—that is, derivatives—in bankruptcy should be amended).
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Our goals for this analysis are two: First, we hope that lawmakers will
consider making the simple adjustments in the treatment of derivatives
and repos that we have proposed—or, alternatively, the more limited ad-
justments we have identified as providing most of the benefits of full
transaction consistency. Second, we hope that lawmakers will keep the
transaction consistency principle in mind when the next wave of financial
innovations arrives in the future, as it surely will.203
203. Although our particular concern in this Essay has been repos and derivatives,
deviations from transaction consistency have created problems in other contexts as well.
The most obvious is the special treatment of consumer mortgages. Unlike most other
loans, which can be written down to the value of the collateral if the collateral is worth less
than the debtor owes, mortgages on primary residences cannot be altered by debtors
under Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006) (noting Chapter 13 plan may
“modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a
security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence”). The special
treatment of mortgages may have contributed to the distortions in the mortgage market
during the real estate bubble, and many commentators (including one of us) believe that
removing the special treatment might have hastened homeowners’ recovery from the
recent economic crisis. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Phobia, 82 Temp. L. Rev.
333, 334–35, 340 (2010) (describing defeat of proposals for reform).
